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From the Peace of Westphalia to the present, the ruling elites of kingdoms and states have 
attempted one international bargain after another for a variety of purposes. Whether it is 
to protect the integrity of a ruling system such as aristocratic orders, the prevention of 
power politics, or the mere hope of avoiding the scourge of world war, the West has 
consistently sought to use multilateral institutions to accomplish these ends, among 
others. What causes these multilateral attempts to succeed or fail, and more importantly, 
what is multilateralism’s center of gravity? 
This thesis suggests that the fear and attractions of state leaders—and the 
circumstance within which they perceive these fears and attractions—is the center of 
gravity of the West’s most important multilateral attempts. These attempts include the 
Peace of Westphalia, the British Act of Union, the Congress System, the League of 
Nations, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Furthermore, it is these human traits among elite figures in the context of historical study 
that best explain the success or failure of Western Multilateralism over that of the 
application of theoretical sciences. 
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I. FEAR AND ATTRACTION IN STATECRAFT: WESTERN 
MULTILATERALISM’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS 
Continental Europe’s multilateral attempts at diplomacy to prevent war and 
devastation among its several nations often finally failed until the post-World War II 
international order. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia sought to prevent religious and 
populist passions from overthrowing Europe’s great powers yet the French Revolution 
and Napoleon’s Grand Armee destroyed that international order. The later Concert or 
Classical System, from 1815 until 1853, aimed to prevent the rise of another populist and 
revolutionary threat but was destroyed from within by the Industrial Revolution and the 
rise of a newly unified Germany. The Classical System of alliances crafted in the 1880s 
in the end actually contributed to both the outbreak and massiveness of World War I.1  
Finally, the League of Nations’ failure to contain internal revolutions and expansionist 
Germany and Japan in the midst of the Great Depression led to the outbreak of World 
War II, particularly after Hitler first left the League and then thwarted it to prevent 
retaliation of his early aggressions.2   
Despite all of checkered experience of great power failures, the ideals of these 
international bargains stayed alive, and those unique European values of togetherness, 
tolerance, and restraint found a home in the United Kingdom. Through compromise and 
circumstance, rather than conquest, the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales began 
a long path that began with Queen Elizabeth’s death in 1606 and eventfully formed a new 
British nation, and, more importantly, a common British identity. More impressively, this 
British experiment, one centered on common interest and compromise, overcame a 
history of bloodshed and cultural rivalry within itself every bit as bitter as those within 
continental Europe.3 
1  Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of 
Our Time, 4th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) xiv–4, 24–60, 269–279.  
2 George Gill, The League of Nations: From 1929 to 1946 (New York: Avery, 1996), 7–12.; Lauren, 
Force and Statecraft, xiv–4, 269–279. 
3 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 1–
54. 
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Fortunately, the British example is not the only occurrence of multilateral success 
in Europe. The emergence of a post-World War II international order in the late 1940s 
and its institutional design centered on the United Nations and NATO did not only end 
centuries of inter-European conflict, but protected Europe from the Soviet Union and 
nuclear holocaust with the upshot of peace in 1989. These new multilateral systems 
founded and designed by the West—a family now including the powerful United States 
in the NATO alliance and U.N. Security Council—brought periods of relative peace to 
the world unknown in centuries before the 1980s. While this peaceful environment has 
had its constant spouts of rivalry between members—especially between the United 
States, France, and the Soviet Union/Russia—the values of restraint, togetherness, and 
the abhorrence of Machtpolitik have not only solidified Europe’s peace and prosperity, 
but have permeated and affected the whole globe to varying—yet significant—degrees.   
Why did this peace eventuate in the face of such much failure of other state 
systems and great power arrangements?  How did Europe’s attempts at conciliatory 
international orders in the past fail so violently yet succeed so enduringly—albeit 
ambivalently—after World War II?  This thesis aims to answer those questions by 
determining the most important forces responsible for this change. What are the most 
important forces, or centers of gravity, that best explain the success or failure of Western 
multilateral institutions to achieve peaceful, collective, and prosperous togetherness over 
narrow national self-interest and Machtpolitik?4 
This thesis argues that the key two forces that allow multilateral institutions to 
survive and function are fear and attraction and their effect on countries’ decision makers. 
Additionally, fear and attraction in statecraft signify both double-edged swords of 
domestic and international politics. These two forces of statecraft can both strengthen and 
weaken multilateral institutions.   
 
4 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 70–101. 
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A. CENTERS OF GRAVITY AMONG CENTRIPETAL AND 
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES 
In order to communicate the essence of a center of gravity one must turn to the 
term’s theoretical founder as such applies to how nations deal with each other. 
Considered by many to be the foremost thinker of military matters, Prussian military 
officer Carl von Clausewitz described the human element in war by portraying combat’s 
exercise as a friction-dominated event affected by everything from organization and 
leadership to the fighting spirit of the masses of soldiers seeking to accomplish their 
objectives over their exhaustion and primal fear. In On War, one of the key elements that 
Clausewitz determines necessary for victory is a strategy that protects one’s own and 
destroys the enemy’s center of gravity. Sometimes this center of gravity is an enemy 
capital; other times it may be the enemy’s army or leader, and still other times it may be 
as nuanced as a public’s faith in a government’s political legitimacy or the general faith 
in an ideological cause; ultimately, the center of gravity is the one thing that will mean 
failure for the belligerent that loses it. For example, during World War II, the German 
center of gravity was likely as concrete as its capital city. During the American Civil 
War, the center of gravity ended up being as nuanced and decentralized as the common 
Southerner’s will to fight—a will that was not defeated until General Sherman’s 
destructive march through the heart of the South.5   
What Clausewitz makes clear is that every war has its own center of gravity and 
every war is unique. Multilateral diplomacy is similar to war; it is human, full of friction, 
and like war, its center of gravity differs across Western multilateralism’s wide array of 
history and circumstance; therefore, Clausewitz’s concept of center of gravity is the ideal 
ideation that will be used to identify Western multilateral institutions key centripetal and 
centrifugal forces.6 
The most profound problems concerning the identification and relevance of the 
forces involved with surviving multilateral institutions are the diverse elements that 
5 Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interest (Annapolis, Naval Institute 
Press, 2001), 128. 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) 74–100. 
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contribute as centripetal and centrifugal elements in multilateral cohesion and 
momentum. An initial, but incomplete list of the possible centers of gravity and other 
contributing forces include:  diplomatic efficiency, realist balancing and buck-passing, 
burden-sharing and shifting, prosperity from economic interdependence creating 
momentum for institutions, faith in Kantian peace theories, adverseness to Machtpolitik 
socialized from two world wars, normative values of the West, the Cold War, interest of 
the U.S. hegemon, genius of the institutions original design, detrimental alternatives, 
value of human rights, goals of peaceful socialization, political will and many other 
factors.7   
What this thesis attempts to establish is a much shorter list that can be 
heuristically but effectively summarized—while being all encompassing—as the most 
important centers of gravity that allow multilateral institutions to be effective enough to 
survive. In other words, what are Western multilateralism’s centers of gravity? 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Western multilateralism and its institutions are different things to different people; 
the ire displayed by the Federal Republic of Germany after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
2003 is a prime example. The George W. Bush administration viewed multilateral 
organizations as merely a means to support its own national interest, while the Germans 
view the modern conciliatory world order as an end in its unique history inherited from 
Bismarck and Hitler. On the one hand, U.S. history brims with pride concerning both 
world wars; the United States sees itself as the savior of the West and democracy. On the 
other hand, the Germans’ view of their past centers on German unilateral action being the 
cause of these wars. As such, a key part of their redemption, and re-entrance into a 
respectable world order, was NATO’s need of their contribution for the defense of 
Europe under an international order based on multilateral consensus. Therefore, the mere 
7 Peter Pham, “Brave Not-So-New World: A Case for Realism and Multilateralism,” The National 
Interest (April 2004): http://nationalinterest.org/article/brave-not-so-new-world-a-case-for-realism-and-
multilateralism-2619; Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 87–90; Lauren, Force and Statecraft: 
Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time, xiv–4; Wallace Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden 
Shifting (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2003) 84–85, 250–258. 
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thought of acting outside Western international values and consensus is anathema to 
Germany’s contemporary essence.  
This divergence of views undergirds very different ideas (and policies) on 
maintaining and advancing the Western system of statecraft and security. To Germans 
and other European critics, particularly after the widespread anti-American 
demonstrations in Europe on 15 February 2003, the U.S. rejection of international 
restraint, combined with the unmatched U.S. military, actually poses a threat to the 
international system—a system they need to be comfortable with their redemptive 
identity as a leader of a civilized and relevant Europe. After all, if the Washington feels 
free to disregard the international system, what is to keep less benevolent nations from 
feeling empowered to do the same?  Thus, traditional allies with a history of fruitful 
cooperation become unfriendly during the Iraq War.8 
But why does the rest of Europe see multilateral institutions so differently from 
the United States?  One key difference is the power of the United States compared to its 
European allies; Washington nearly has more economic power than all of the EU 
members combined and nearly equals the rest of the world in defense spending.9  Europe 
is to a degree dependent on these multilateral institutions not only for common security 
against a less conciliatory world, but also against U.S. hegemony; however, it is this 
hegemon that has and continues to provide the secure environment that Europe craves 
and prospers from.   
Conversely, Washington wants Europe to accept more responsibility and acquire 
more military power so that it may take some of the world’s security burden off the 
United States’ back. However, Washington still wants to lead and control the transatlantic 
8 Rober Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review No. 113 (June and July 2002): 3–18.; Jürgen 
Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012), 9–12. 
9 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Field Listing: GDP (Washington, DC: OPA, 2012), 
https://www.cia.gov/contact-cia/index.html. [The EU GDP is 16.21 trillion USD and U.S. GDP is 15.65]; 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook (2012). 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2012/04. [U.S. defense spending was 766 billion USD in 2012 and nearly 
equaled the rest of the world combined.] 
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community to benefit U.S. interest through its central role in NATO, which is something 
that Europe dislikes yet desires all at the same time.10  
NATO is the best example of multilateralism’s essence. It is nations wanting their 
cake and eating it too. This simple observation allows multilateral institutions to be seen 
in their proper light: They are ambivalent and have myriad forces pulling their cohesion 
apart, and yet fears of alternatives, namely multilateralism without Washington’s power 
and Machtpolitik itself, pushing them together. While the NATO example is but a tip of 
the iceberg, the same forces that pull apart and push its unity together is similar to the 
internal and interest based challenges of all Western multilateral institutions present and 
past. It is the conflict, down to each individual nation, between national self-interest and 
the common good that gives Western multilateralism its essence. Therefore, identifying 
the centripetal and centrifugal forces that determine togetherness or disunity becomes 
difficult to accomplish given the multitudes of diverging interests between different 
nations sharing common goals. Because all of these nations, from the powerful United 
States to tiny Belgium, multiply considerations of the national self-interest versus the 
collective good; therefore, the challenge is to identify the most important forces of 
Western multilateral bargains that cut across history back to the Peace of Westphalia and 
are present in the current international order. The forces that are most present and 
relevant throughout history are Western multilateralism’s centers of gravity.11 
Western multilateralism, however, goes beyond the simple self-interest, fears, and 
attractions of various states; it is also a matter of morals and the constant dispute of what 
is considered to be right, wrong, naïve, safe, dangerous, or reckless in the minds of man. 
Above all, the moral elements of multilateralism are paradoxical; if altruism can be 
exploited by adversaries, noble peace-seeking ideals merely disadvantage the inhabitants 
of a state. Accordingly, defending the inhabitants of the state could be viewed as altruistic 
in itself. The historical thinkers that best promote and provide the philosophical 
arguments to the various sides of this debate are Saint Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel 
10 Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” 3–18.; Thies, Friendly Rivals, 84–85, 250–258. 
11 Ibid, 250–258. 
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Kant on the altruistic multilateral side and Niccoló Machiavelli with Carl Schmitt on the 
other.  
In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas, based on writings from Saint Augustine, 
articulated the view that rulers had an obligation to conduct wars only if those wars were 
just. Aquinas made clear that wars were only just if they were carried out by a legitimate 
ruler, done to right a wrong, and sought lasting peace as the end goal. This moral code 
was later promoted and enlarged by clergymen who determined that an international 
system was needed to enforce such lofty standards, ensure that wars were indeed just, and 
save Christendom from endless and senseless violence that would undoubtedly occur 
without such moral international restraints between rulers that would always feel 
threatened by their neighbors. In this way, the ultimate goal of peace was served by an 
interstate order that had distinctively multilateral characteristics.12 
Niccoló Machiavelli resoundingly rejected this ethical paradigm three centuries 
later. Machiavelli was a man of prominence in the republic of Florence at the turn of the 
16th century when the French conquered his city-state. Possibly due to this experience of 
invasion, as well as the imprisonment and torture he endured while in French custody, 
Machiavelli adopted the view that the consequences of losing made victory necessary at 
all costs. He elaborated this paradigm in his 1513 work The Prince: 
You must know that there are two methods of fighting, one by law, the 
other by force; the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as 
the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the 
second. It is therefore necessary for a prince to know well how to use both 
the beast and the man.13 
Machiavelli’s words echo both the fear that comes from having been a victim to 
“force” and the “beasts” that wielded it, and the attraction of having a strong and 
victorious state—even if doing so requires less than ethical means. Indeed, his personal 
experience likely also cast a cold, critical light on any cherished notions of a mutually 
peaceable community of Christian European territories; war and survival were the order 
12 Paul Sigmund, ed., St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), 
64–65.; Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 5–6. 
13 Ibid, 6. 
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of the day. Machiavelli later writes in The Prince that leaders must “keep good faith and 
live with integrity,” but the interest of the state is paramount and “the end justifies the 
means.”14 Machiavelli viewed the world as a zero-sum environment that would always 
have winners and suffering losers, and, a good ruler should ensure his country and 
subjects where among the victorious side; not doing so was a failure to protect his 
subjects’ interests and welfare. 
The philosophical arguments against Machiavelli—like those of Benard du Rosier 
and numerous other thinkers influenced by Aquinas’ writings—sought a peaceful 
multilateral security centered on normative standards over that of Machiavellian security 
provided by power. These clergymen stressed the incontrovertible reality of 
interdependence between states; they also believed the brutality of war forced upon 
leaders a moral obligation to temper ambition with international norms of restraint, 
conciliation, and consultation. In other words, these clergymen placed a moral value on 
peace itself and therefore saw just wars as a necessary evil to achieve a latter peace and 
unjust wars as completely immoral and therefore must be prevented.   
Machiavelli placed the moral imperative on leaders to protect their land and 
people. Therefore, even benevolent rulers had the following ethical dilemma:  Though the 
just-war ethical code and its multilateral offshoot philosophies were peace seeking and 
favorable to God’s and the Church’s will, adherence to this ethical standard could lead to 
rulers and their subjects alike to fall under the yoke of foreign oppression if other rulers 
took advantage of this benevolent code. Conversely, while reliance on state power gave 
rulers and their subjects less risk of foreign oppression, the means to accomplish this 
protection through superior power encouraged rulers to enter war for the sake of power 
alone and that would make war more or less constant.15 
14 Ibid, 7. 
15 Ibid, 5–6.  The fact that all of these men lived in Florence, Milan, Mantua, or Tuscany—all states 
relatively small that faced threats not only from one another, but larger nations from outside their region, 
perhaps explain their paradigms of accepting rivalry’s reality while simultaneously restraining their actions 
in case that they needed each other to confront a larger threat from outside their region later on.  In other 
words the opinions of these Renaissance multilateral thinkers are made from positions of desperateness. 
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Neither the multilateral just-war philosophies nor the Machiavellian philosophical 
counterpart had a monopoly on either fear or attraction. On the one hand, multilateral just 
war philosophies feared that international anarchy forced rulers to engage in constant war 
for no other reason than self-preservation, creating a vicious cycle. These clergymen were 
also attracted to peace as a normative virtue and that in itself made their multilateral 
preference a moral issue rather than an issue of states’ interests. On the other hand, the 
fear of invasion—in the present or the future—caused Machiavellian thought to view 
altruistic desires of peace for peace’s sake as an ironic moral evil. Because the threat of 
invasion, or the rise of a rival’s power could make an invasion more likely in the future, 
rulers’ fears caused them to be attracted to Machiavellian philosophy because more state 
power alleviated fears of invasion. In other words, multilateral just war philosophers 
feared war and were attracted to peace, while Machiavellian proponents feared losing 
wars and were attracted to security in the form of greater power.   
In later times this religious versus state interest debate became liberal versus 
absolutism within the multilateral paradox. Prussian enlightenment thinker Immanuel 
Kant proposed that peace was an accidental state of affairs but one that could be made 
long-lasting if democratic republicanism replaced absolutist regimes given that monarchs 
tend to enjoy the continuity of court life as the people suffer the scourge of war. 
Furthermore, a league of nations could be formed to preserve peace and foster prosperity 
if all the nations adopted liberal republics because no self-ruled people would commit 
themselves to the unpleasantness of war. To Kant, peace’s best chance was political and 
self-interested commoner’s desires rather than religious, but the goal of peace as an end 
within itself over that of national security through power was also in its self a continuity 
with Aquinian thought from earlier times. It was simply a matter of the West having 
enough democratic governance to ensure “perpetual peace.”16 
Carl Schmitt was to Kantian thought what Machiavelli was to Aquinian thought: a 
cold shock of reality to altruistic and democratic dreams of “perpetual peace” theory. 
Schmitt was an interwar German philosopher of conservative persuasion; however, 
16 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1986), Kindle edition, chap. 1. 
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conservatism in the Weimar context meant protection of the state against accesses of 
individual and democratic liberalism and should not be confused with modern day free 
market conservatism represented by the likes of American Republicans, British 
Conservatives, or the German Christen Democrats. Before the rise of the Nazis, Schmitt 
feared that the liberal and democratic nature of Weimar Germany left the state open to be 
liberally overran by radicals on the far right or left who would later turn the state into one 
of their own image after taking charge. Essentially, he saw the immerging political 
liberalism in Europe as an ideological presence harmful to the ultimate peace and 
prosperity of the people because people would vote for the benefit of themselves rather 
than for the benefit of the state, and according to Schmitt, the nation-state itself allowed 
for the conditions of stability and a decent life. In other words, he believed the liberal 
democracy unchecked would lead to the individual citizen separating himself from the 
nation and state only to attach himself to his political faction, which would weaken the 
state as a nation and turn the government into a state of an exclusive ideology making 
enemies of its own national people. He later turned Nazi after the rise of Hitler for 
various reasons, with anti-Semitism being one of the more prominent ones, along with his 
desire not be viewed as an outsider by the Nazi regime; however, his political warnings 
of the fate of the liberal Weimar Germany were prescient indeed.17 
Schmitt, however, offers more than just a counter to Kantian thought for the 
purpose of this thesis. Additionally, it is his observations of human nature that highlight 
two stark realities. First, altruism—whether it is Aquinian or Kantian—is nothing more 
than another method of determining who has political power. If states agree to be 
multilaterally restrained from war or internationally committed to enforcing peace, 
they—if they are truly committed to such—must have a political power or force of some 
kind forcing them to do as such and that dictates that somebody else has that power to 
compel—through force or other means—whether it is based on liberal methods or not. In 
other words, who rules and decides politically for this multilateral entity? Second, 
according to Schmitt, man is dictated by his drives and the two most dominating drives 
17 Tracy Strong, “Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate Around Carl Schmitt,” in The Concept of 
the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Kindle edition. 
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are love and fear. Man is not dangerous because of his fear, but because of his fear he 
must give himself “fearfulness” as in the ability to make others fear him so that he may 
have the power—political, military, or otherwise—to ensure he is more safe and can feel 
less fear.18  In other words, altruism does not matter in the end, but fear does. 
Given that national leaders are individual creatures driven by fear and the 
attraction to lessen their fear, it is what drives fear and attraction that determine their 
actions concerning their role in multilateral institutions. This is not to say that it is 
impossible for altruism and normative ideals of peace and freedom to matter, in fact the 
United States demonstrates this; however, the United States is an anomaly more so than 
the norm given that the nation in its nascent was founded on the fear of a tyrannical 
government and made altruistic ideals such as liberty a political force. Likewise, Western 
Europe embraced the leadership of the United States within the United Nations and 
NATO for their fear of domestic upheaval and Soviet domination after World War II and 
the Cold War; therefore, the post-World War II multilateral order was attractive to 
alleviate both fears all the while allowing liberal altruism to become an element of 
political force itself through elections. 
The center of gravity concerning multilateralism is ultimately a dynamic of 
individual men and women. They fear losing sovereignty or political influence if they are 
a head of state, average citizens fear not only foreign invasion but the tyranny of their 
own governments, and all, whether they be elite or commoner, are all attracted to 
alleviating fear. It is in this human trait of fear, and the circumstances that these 
individuals exist within, that determine whether their own decision-making calculations 
make multilateral institutions effective because multilateral institutions are ultimately 
only empowered to do what the states they consist of permit the international body to 
achieve. Therefore, Western multilateralism’s center of gravity is the fear and attraction 
of state decision makers. Ironically, the philosophical ideations that provide the most 
effective insight to understand and maintain the peaceful multilateral order of the 
democratic West today come from the military minded Clausewitz and a Nazi. 
18 Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt,” in The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), Kindle edition. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The arguments concerning multilateralism consist of IR theory, which attempts to 
explain and predict, and the historical method, which attempts to explain by providing 
chronology, cause, effect, and judgment of the past that affect our current circumstances. 
The IR field can be separated into numerous distinct arguments that not only disagree on 
the dynamics of multilateral organizations but also disagree on these institutions’ 
relevance, purpose, and general essence.  
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in Security Communities best establish the 
core element in the various IR theories’ divergence by asking if the absence of war is 
caused by “material forces alone or of material and normative forces.”19  Essentially, do 
values and norms matter?  While the realists have moderated throughout generations, 
they still view multilateral institutions as bodies that are nothing more than elements of 
their environment predetermined by the interest of great powers or superpowers. As E.H. 
Carr suggests, “to internationalize government in any real sense means to internationalize 
power.”20  Carr also suggests in The Twenty Years’ Crisis that the power of individual 
nations within multilateral organizations matters most. Rather it is smaller countries 
following suit with Britain and France’s exit of the gold standard, or militarily weak 
countries seeking the shadow of great powers to protect themselves, the advantages of 
power make these organizations merely a different method of great powers using 
international systems to their advantage.21  He also rejects altruism as naïve by stating, 
“It is profoundly misleading to represent the struggle between satisfied and dissatisfied 
Powers as a struggle between morality on one side and power on the other.”22 
Essentially, multilateralism is simply a tool of power and the value of normative 
motivations is futile. 
19 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,” in 
Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998) 10. 
20 Robert Kaplan, Warrior Politics (New York: Random House, 2002) 145. 
21 Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964) 104–105. 
22 Ibid, 195. 
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One of the most profound works to date on liberal IR theory is Triangulating 
Peace by Bruce Russett and John Oneal. This book and the larger liberal community see 
multilateral institutions as a beneficial result and reinforcement of liberal governance and 
economic interdependence between states. As disciples of Kantian peace theories, Russett 
and Oneal explain that democratic institutions have the desire for peace because their 
leaders are beholden to electorates and the misery of war makes people not want to 
experience it without good cause. Because free people like economic prosperity—and 
economic interdependence is a method of gaining that goal—war is not only discouraged 
by the will of the people for normative reasons, but the prosperity of economic 
interdependence can be interrupted by violent conflict. Because free people like peace 
and prosperity, free governments have the motivation to standardize trade and commerce 
practices between nations to increase prosperity and seek long lasting peace. These 
dynamics, according to liberals, allow liberal governance to solidify freedom’s benefits 
through multilateral organizations and reinforce democracy and interdependence due to 
their common democratic values.23  Essentially, liberals believe in the power of liberal 
civilization to overcome the Kultur of zero-sum power politics.24 
Social constructivists, on the other hand, credit common efforts and togetherness 
between nations to mankind’s innate nature. By combining psychological theories of 
identity formulation with the international relations community, constructivist credit our 
heuristic nature of viewing the world as “we” and “others” as the reason multilateralism 
and peace itself can exist. Much like a person raised in the American South would view 
himself as a Georgian, a “Southerner,” and an American, the international community 
subscribes to multiple identities or indicators at one time. Additionally, this approach 
allows disparate groups to interchange their relation to one another. For example, while a 
Californian may view this same hypothetical Georgian as an “other” within the confines 
of American regions, the Georgian “other” forms part of a “we” when the Californian is 
confronted by, say, Italians or other international identities. Whether it is NATO or the 
23 Ibid, 24–28, 39, 303. 
24 Victoria Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through 20th–Century Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) 21. 
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EU, constructivists argue that it is human nature for the democratic free West to find 
common identity due to its common enlightenment values and intertwined history when 
contrasted to the authoritarian nature of the old Soviet bloc or the less liberal remainder 
of the world.25   
Additionally, these identities are malleable through exposure; by the world being 
interconnected and interdependent, constructivists predict that the globalized and post-
modern world will lose much of its past hostility as we are more familiar with those 
“others” we used to fear, and therefore, this lessoning of fear will allow the preconditions 
of past conflicts to be abated. Thomas Risse, an ardent constructivist, argues in A 
Community of Europeans, that the European Union will experience wide (mass 
acceptance) and deep (an article of faith) success because Europeans are constantly 
exposed to each other through business, media exposure, and common interest 
concerning economic wellbeing proliferated through a common European market. 
Therefore, constructivists view multilateral institutions as a symptom and vital enhancer 
of common identities and a conciliatory international order for that matter.26 
Paul Lauren, Gordon Craig, and Alexander George’s Force and Statecraft provide 
a diplomatic historians’ take on multilateral institutions. By crediting a “longstanding and 
enduring human desire to find limits and to appreciate their value in restraining 
destructive competition and violence” the authors attribute common security’s failure and 
success to the myriad forces present at the time of conflict that determine if the 
established international order is able to overcome its internal and external challenges.27  
By covering history from the Peloponnesian War to the modern era, the authors 
determine that in order for common security to work it must have: a genuine consensus 
and “shared goals,” an appropriate structure and a “status hierarchy among them,” 
“accepted values and procedures,” and “it must be able to adapt to new developments and 
25 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (London: 
Cornell University Press, 2010) 1–87, 243. 
26 Ibid, 1–87, 243. 
27 Paul Lauren, Gordon Graig, and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft, 4th ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 266. 
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to internal changes within its membership.”28 Force and Statecraft is written by two 
diplomatic historians and a political scientist and, thus, lacks the constraints of IR 
paradigms and attempts to explain the events of past multilateral attempts through 
chronology, cause, effect, and judgment. 
Another historical perceptive to understand how the West moved from a warring 
environment to its modern conciliatory form is Victoria de Grazia’s Irresistible Empire. 
Grazia demonstrates how consumerism allowed a revolution from below to transform 
everything about Europe; her work suggest that the changed nature of the wants and 
needs of Europeans at all social levels after World War II were transformed by American 
business practices, namely mass consumerism, and made internal and international 
conflicts from Europe’s past anachronistic. It was a change of (and in) the masses that 
forced upon European leaders a new paradigm making international trade and social 
welfare—not war—paramount in modern times. Therefore, European commoners moved 
away from nationalist or communist ideologies as a zero-sum means for acquiring needs 
and wants to, instead, demanding the opportunity to purchase washing machines, 
microwaves, and other “electronic servants” through American style capitalism based on 
economic growth that eased past ideological and class divisions and transformed these 
former divisions into nothing more than segments of a market to be profited from by big 
business. Essentially, a lack of scarcity brought about after the end of World War II in 
Europe created a condition favorable to multilateralism.29 
While the historical works on European history concerning the forces that dictate 
multilateral institutions behavior are too numerous to cover in this thesis, it is historical 
method and recognition of underlying political and cultural forces at all levels—from the 
commoner to national leader—that makes a detailed study of historical literature—rather 
than IR literature—the key to supporting this thesis. Therefore, historical works like 
Force and Statecraft and Irresistible Empire are the best method to explain multilateral 
institutions’ centers of gravity. 
28 Ibid, xiv–xv. 
29 De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 458–480. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research question will be addressed by a historical study of Western 
multilateral attempts within the context of the British Act of Union and its aftermath, the 
post-Westphalia age of power politics, the European inter-war period, and the Cold War. 
This historical study will identify trends and forces necessary to separate centers of 
gravity concerning multilateral institutions from its myriad and less relevant dynamics.  
This is a historical study of the chronology, cause, effect, and judgment of the 
actors within these systems to determine what key ingredients are needed for multilateral 
institutions to be effective to a reasonable extent. Such analysis is not a pure science, but 
an art. The object is to identify forces that beget effective multilateral institutions rather 
than using them to validate a specific IR theory. Much like Carl von Clausewitz 
considered in his Meisterstück, on War, to be a study of the art and not the science or 
theory of war, this thesis considers the human element involved with this complicated 
and nuanced subject to beyond the concrete level of any theoretical science and will not 
be treated as such. Therefore, it is only fitting that Clausewitz’s concept of wars having a 
center of gravity is ideal to explain Western multilateralism; for multilateralism, like war, 
are human experiences consisting of logic, passions, chance, and above all … friction.30 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first chapter will present the British unification as a microcosm of civilizing 
forces overcoming cultural divergence as an example of multilateralism done right and 
lessons learned from this will be used as a transition to continental Europe’s less 
successful multilateral experience. The second chapter will provide an analysis of the 
multilateral systems in Europe from the Thirty Years War to World War I with emphasis 
on how fear and attraction dictated the methods state leaders used when seeking their 
regimes’ security; one way was nation-state military power and the other was 
international multilateral restraint. The third chapter will cover the interwar period 
between World War I and World War II and describe how a predominately democratic, 
nationalist, and war adverse Europe ended one world war to only create the conditions 
30 Clausewitz, On War, 74–100 
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necessary for fear and attraction to bring about the demise of the League of Nations along 
with a second and worse world war.   
The fourth and final chapter will cover the post-World War II order and the Cold 
War. This chapter will demonstrate how the weakening of Europe, rise of American and 
Soviet superpowers, nuclear weapons, and American styled consumerism changed the 
essence of every European and gave multilateralism a favorable environment. 
Afterwards, the thesis’s conclusion will explain how fear and attraction have benefited 
the post-Cold War world order, but however, will also explain how some underlying 
forces enabled by the West’s values in themselves could ultimately undermine 
multilateralism’s current favorable environment. 
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II. MULTILATERALISM’S BRITISH EXAMPLE 
Contemporary history rarely considers the United Kingdom a successful 
multilateral endeavor. Arguably, however, Britain seems like a singular nation rather than 
a multilateral effort among the old kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales because 
this multilateral endeavor was so successful. Since 1707, Great Britain has been a united 
nation under one government. Until Union, however, British politics and society were an 
ongoing exercise in multilateralism in its purest form. Britain’s path from becoming the 
United Kingdom in 1603 and its later national Union in 1707 and beyond demonstrate the 
characteristics of Western multilateralism’s most profound and effective effort; 
moreover, the insight of its history allows Britain to be a successful benchmark to 
compare other multilateral efforts’ successes and failures and more importantly the 
circumstances that allow these efforts’ to succeed or fail.31  
A. TOGETHERNESS BY CIRCUMSTANCE 
The death of Queen Elizabeth Tudor without an heir in 1603 placed the British 
Isles in a unique and volatile situation.   England, the more advanced and dominant 
power on the islands, found itself ruled by the king of its Scottish rival through dynastic 
succession, the result of an arranged marriage that occurred roughly a century before. 
King James VI, from Scotland’s House of Stuart, inherited England on Elizabeth’s 
death.32  
Part of this strange turn of events owed to Elizabeth’s own decrees. In order to 
secure her own claim to the crown in a fractious and unquiet age, she had banned any 
literature or public actions on the topic of potential heirs lest any of the candidates turn 
out to have a better claim than her own. After all, one the decisive elements that put 
Elizabeth—a woman!—on the throne in the first place was her Protestant faith.33 She and 
31 Leanda de Lisle, After Elizabeth: The Rise of James of Scotland and the Struggle for the Throne of 
England (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005) 3–7. 
32 Ibid, 3–7. 
33 John Guy, “The Tudor Age: 1485–1603,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain, ed. Kenneth 
Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 266–267. 
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her supporters had important reasons to nip any rival in the royal bud. In fact, there were 
many who thought Elizabeth’s cousin, Mary, Queen of Scots, had a more legitimate 
claim to the throne; however, Mary was Catholic and had an unsettling affinity for 
France. England meant to remain Protestant and aloof from its largest Continental rival.34   
But out of this same turmoil arose—in the unlikely person of James VI—the first 
hopes for a multilateral stability: 
Courtiers feared that the price of Elizabeth’s security during her life would 
be civil war and foreign invasion on her death—but the future was also 
replete with possibilities. A new monarch drawn from a weak field would 
need to acquire widespread support to secure his or her position against 
rivals. That meant opening up the royal purse: there would be gifts of land, 
office and title.35 
Indeed, England was a kingdom not ruled by a centralized bureaucracy capable of 
efficient and authoritarian enforcement many continental nations exercised, but instead 
was a system of enticing cooperation from its English subjects, parliament, and nobles. 
At the time of Elizabeth’s death the coronation of an Englishmen with questionable 
credentials, and thus vulnerable to usurpation, could only mean treacherous times at 
worst or expensive effort to buy off potential royal contenders at best. Simply, the fear of 
worse alternatives and the attraction of a way to avoid those fears made James a preferred 
option upon Elizabeth’s death; any other option would have been too destabilizing.36  In 
the event, in these awkward times, meant that compromise, tolerance, and other Anglo-
Saxon values became attractive options. James had no hope of consolidating is rule with 
any other method than attraction—not only to attract support from his new English 
subjects, but to draw closer the Scots as well, who justly feared being victim of English 
hegemony within this new United Kingdom.37 
By 1707, England, Scotland, and Wales had been under a single dynasty for more 
than a hundred years. They remained distinct though interconnected in many ways. 
34 Lisle, After Elizabeth, 3–7. 
35 Ibid, 6–7. 
36 Ibid, 7–18. 
37 Ibid, 3–7. 
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Scotland, in particular, stubbornly held to the prerogatives of an autonomous power long 
after the politics had shifted real power to London. While some laws applied to the 
overall United Kingdom, the Scots had their own legal system and legislature.38  
On the other hand, the Scotts around Edinburgh and other lowland population 
centers had become more like their English neighbors than their rural highland 
countrymen. This development is to be expected considering the economic 
interdependence between the English and Scottish subjects along with the proliferation of 
printing presses, abundantly available English books that regularly ended up in Scotland, 
and the myriad mass-produced goods that circulated throughout the kingdoms. Scottish 
tradesmen had become attracted to opportunity in the prosperous South and Englishmen 
had benefit to be gained from trading and collaborating with their northern neighbors. 
Additionally, the lack of any significant warfare between the kingdoms benefited the 
security of Englishmen and Scot alike—to say nothing of the trade and commercial 
bonds; between 1630 and 1680 alone, the monarchs tax revenue had more than 
doubled.39 
Then another childless monarch, now Queen Anne of the Stuart dynasty, once 
again threatened the same chaos of succession dreaded a century earlier.40 England and 
Scotland now had even more to lose. Queen Ann’s situation thus led the Parliament of 
Westminster to pass the Act of Union that linked the three kingdoms into one Great 
Britain under one Protestant ruler with a common legislature and free trade system. For 
many, Union marked the least bad of the available—or conceivable—options: 
The politicians in London had feared that unless a formal, political union 
with Scotland was cemented, as distinct from the existing dynastic union, 
the country might opt on the death of poor childless Queen Anne for 
James Edward Stuart, her exiled Roman Catholic half-brother, instead of 
agreeing, as the English and Welsh had already done, to import a new 
38 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 
11–12. 
39 Ibid, 11–12.; John Morrill, “The Stuarts: 1603–1688,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of Britain, 
ed. Kenneth Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 298. 
40 Colley, Britons 11–12. 
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Protestant dynasty from Hanover. A full, legislative union was the only 
solution London was prepared to consider.41 
The English were more powerful than their northern neighbors yet still sought a 
solution amenable to the people of both kingdoms, a testament to the multilateral spirit of 
an emerging united country. Without question, however, it was English desire for 
stability, prosperity, and security on the island—rather than lofty ideals or any abiding 
affection for the Scots—that impelled England to seek a multilateral arrangement with 
Scotland.42 
The compromise was profound for the day. Rather than trying to strong-arm the 
Scots into compliance, or merely allowing a Stuart clamant to entice the Scots to break 
away, most likely amid devastating warfare, the English decided it was better to grant the 
Scots more influence within a consolidated government. Now a non-English people, who 
had been enemies in the past, would have the power to influence English policy on 
English soil through a common parliament. Thus, the English actually sacrificed some of 
their own sovereignty to the Scottish; the price of unity and security was paid for in the 
currency of sovereignty.43  
B. PROTESTANT UNITY AND THE CATHOLIC THREAT 
While English raison d’état clearly justifies the 1707 Act of Union at the national 
level, yet to be explained is how this union of politics translated into a common British 
identity and why the inhabitants of the new Great Britain actually became a united people 
who accepted and embraced this multilateral arrangement. After all, a degree of common 
identity, togetherness, and sincerely shared values are important; without it, any union is 
merely a conceptual design waiting to be ripped apart as soon as circumstance provides 
more centrifugal forces over that of centripetal ones.44  In order for multilateralism to 
41 Ibid, 12. 
42 Ibid, 11–12. 
43 Ibid, 11–12. 
44 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, xiv. 
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work over time, British unity needed to be a process of habits and motivations that 
reinforced it against circumstance’s future friction.   
This rise of “Britishness,” like most transitions of identity and togetherness, did 
not occur overnight in Great Britain but is the result of various forces at play that 
influenced the actions, beliefs, and essence of the emerging British identity. This process 
of a people not only viewing themselves differently—like a Scotsmen seeing himself as 
British—but viewing a former foe as one of their own brethren was a process that began 
with the one commonality they had, Protestantism, and was reinforced by the common 
threat they feared: Catholic power.45    
A poem, a chant, and unofficial battle cry, James Thomson wrote the following 
lines in 1740; the poems nationalist allure continues in Britain to this day at myriad 
events ranging from concert halls to sporting events: 
When Britain first at heaven’s command, 
Arose from out the azure main, 
This was the charter of the land. 
And guardian angels sung this strain: 
‘Rule Britannia, rule the waves, 
Britons never will be slaves.’46 
While Thomson’s words—specifically “Britons never will be slaves”47—do not speak 
the issue of Catholicism explicitly, once the threat and antagonisms of the Papacy, 
France, and Spain are taken into account, the connection between slavery and 
Catholicism becomes clearer.  
British fear of Catholic rule was no mere ghost story conjured up by those in love 
with the idea of British unity. Not only were Spain and France competitors within the 
colonial world system at the time—and thus rivals to Britain in trade and conquests—but 
Jacobite invasions, military expeditions led by Catholic Stuart claimants with the military 
assistance of France and Spain, threatened not only hinterlands of Scotland but London 
itself. In 1708, 1715, and 1745, Jacobite invasions landed on Scottish soil and moved 
south. While these invasions were ultimately defeated, they along with other potential 
45 Colley, Britons, 11–54. 
46 Ibid, 11. 
47 Ibid, 11. 
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invasions in 1717, 1719, 1720–1721, 1743, and 1759 were decisive in forming British 
identity and appreciation of the Union at both the elite the common level. Because the 
Counter-Reformation was still visiting persecution on common people throughout 
continental Europe, these persecuted Protestants brought stories of their hardships to the 
British Isles after many of them were exiled. As expected these stories found prominent 
place in British newspapers and such publicity had a profound impact on Britain’s 
eighteenth century Protestant Zeitgeist. An article from the Weekly Medley in 1729 gives 
an example of what Britain understood of Catholic rule: 
Our letters from Paris make mention of the renewing of persecution of our 
Protestant brethren, which they pursue with such warmth, that their 
children are forc’d from them, and some put to nunneries, and others to 
monasteries, there to be brought up in the Romish religion, and everyone 
forbid, upon pain of death, to follow the light of his conscience; all 
marriages celebrated by Protestant clergymen, within these four years, to 
be dissolved, and the children to be declared bastards, unless these 
marriages are a second time solemniz’d according to the rites of the 
Romish Church.48 
Furthermore, the fear of Catholic rule and the attraction of mutual security 
overrode previous concerns that both Scotsmen and Englishmen had at the 1707 Act of 
Union. The compromise of 1707 actually assured the security and the redefined 
sovereignty of England and Scotland, whatever each side ceded to the other. This 
eighteenth century British circumstance is a theme that occurs constantly in 
multilateralism in general; new multilateral institution, often wrought of mutually 
antagonistic partners forced into a multilateral bargain by outside forces, ends up 
achieving stability, security, and prosperity.   
With common security achieved among the English, the Welsh, and the Scottish, 
the British could refocus their combined efforts. For the British, the effectiveness of the 
unity facilitated an empire great enough to match the individual ambitions of Englishmen 
and Scotsmen, commoner and elite alike. Blessed with riches, and more importantly a 
profitable role and opportunity within this empire, British power and prosperity therefore 
became a beneficial centripetal force to their multilateral bargain; whatever was good for 
the English and Scotsmen individually was often good for the British Empire and vice-
versa.  
48 Ibid, 24. 
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C. EMPIRE, PROFITS, SCOTTISH AMBITION, AND MUTUAL 
ELEVATION 
One characteristic that the people of Scotland and England had in common, 
besides Protestantism, was the value of trade and profits. This entrepreneurial trait can be 
traced to the same circumstances that gave Britain its essence: it was an island maritime 
power and its governing system allowed self-interested individuals to advance themselves 
and keep fruits of their labor. The British way of governance granted individuals the 
motivation to better their lives through trade and developed an early capitalist spirit. Also 
convenient, the accommodating relationship between landed nobility and upwardly 
mobile tradesmen became a mutually beneficial relationship between trade and state. 
Landed nobles benefited from their relationship with capitalists via loans and business 
connections; the state and nobles alike benefited from taxes and the access credit from 
tradesmen; and tradesmen benefited from the state’s ability to provide security and 
stability, which, in turn, was enhanced by economic prosperity. The system was working 
out for everyone from the Scottish tradesmen to the English landed class:49 
Great Britain was forged in the way that it was after 1707, and to the 
extent that it was, in part because different classes and interest groups 
came to see this newly invented nation as a usable resource, as a focus of 
loyalty which would also cater to their own needs and ambitions. From 
patriotism, men and women were able to anticipate profits of some kind.50 
Another reason for the stability and cohesion of this multilateral system to remain 
in place was credit itself. Because money loaned was money lost if it was not paid back 
but money paid back with interest was profit, solid law and order from the state was 
perpetually beneficial. Contracts had to retain their integrity—that is, be enforceable and 
enforced.51  Therefore, everyone had an interest in the credit system being effective and 
stable. After all, if there was no proper rule of law, and people who had the potential to 
lend money believed they would not profit, those who needed credit would have no 
access. Thus, the multilateral system of British law between former rivals possessed an 
49 Ibid, 55–67. 
50 Ibid, 55. 
51 Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) 260. 
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attraction of prosperity, beneficial order, and the potential for each individual citizen of 
the United Kingdom to make future profits. Signally, prosperity through credit allowed 
everyone, regardless of ancestry, to prosper from the system. Moreover, this prosperity 
was not based on a zero-sum economic system, but instead a fostered a lively exchange 
on the basis of mutual benefit open to any man who could buy, trade, or bargain his way 
in. In the end, this economic order was something Scotsmen and Englishmen alike sought 
to protect.52 
The epoch of colonialism only accelerated these trends—and the profits that went 
with them. Now the state had the army and navy and could provide security at home and 
at many places abroad; colonial holdings allowed tradesmen the opportunity to import 
raw materials from colonized lands and manufacture finished products at home to then 
sell them domestically and abroad. The state collected taxes from those profits; with more 
money the state could increase its military capability and thus open up more foreign 
markets with further conquest. Thus, the state and tradesmen alike had motivation to feed 
the British colonial system bringing empires’ benefit to all of British society.53    
As the British Empire grew to astounding proportions and colonized holdings as 
far as Asia, India, the Middle East, and the Americas, it needed all the talented 
tradesmen, soldiers, sailors, and politically astute persons to run, maintain, and expand its 
empire it could find. The state’s demand for talent and manpower afforded advancement 
opportunity for most of British society, especially the ambitious Scotsman. In the free-
floating and self-adjusting nature of British society, men found attractive roles for 
themselves in the expanding empire and the same imperial system had a demand for their 
ambition—effectively outsourcing their upward mobility or at least directing it outward, 
away from the domestic English establishment.54   
This self-adjusting system also allowed higher degrees of meritocracy, in contrast 
to other European anciens regimes, to provide both motivation and manpower for the 
52 Colley, Britons, 66–67. 
53 Ibid, 56–72. 
54 Ibid, 55–102. Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics, 1707–
1977 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), 96–99. 
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British Empire’s growth. Many affluent English, with plenty of opportunity where they 
already were, decided to coordinate their foreign endeavors from bustling London. On the 
other hand, this arrangement afforded many Scotsman, even though they were 
experiencing increased opportunity in their native homeland as well, to seek adventure, 
potential wealth, and elevated personal prestige by supporting the British Empire’s 
military and commercial endeavor’s overseas. While many Englishmen did seek the same 
opportunities overseas as their Scottish counterparts, the opportunity to benefit oneself 
while also supporting the Empire was most exploited by Scotsmen, many of whom had 
humble beginnings thus the relational improvement of the own conditions made personal 
contribution to the Empire abroad most attractive to those lacking affluent backgrounds. 
In other words, the colonial endeavor also facilitated a certain multilateral amalgamation 
at home, while encouraging a certain loyal entrepreneurship abroad.55 
While the British colonial and proto-capitalist system clearly benefited traders, it 
was the fact that so much of British society was part of this occupation that made the 
system attractive and popular. Not only did one in five British families seek their 
livelihood through trade, but those tradesmen and other interested parties like farmers and 
manufacturers all relied on the domestic order and international access of the Empire to 
increase their own profits.56 There simply was enough benefit gained by enough people 
within this system to ensure its popular buy-in and multilateral momentum into the 
future, so much so that it became habit and part of the essence of every English, Welsh, 
and Scottish citizen within the island to benefit from and contribute to British 
civilization—and accordingly—past cultural divides and other barriers to multilateralism 
became less relevant.57   
Perhaps the most telling indicator of multilateral attraction was how Scotts so 
widely rejected Jacobitism after the mid-1700s. Where in the first half of the century the 
potential of Scottish independence had appeal, and the attraction of Catholic rule was still 
strong among many in Scotland’s highland clans, the growing prosperity of Scots 
55 Colley, Britons, 55–102. 
56 Ibid, 56.; Rosalind Mitchison, A History of Scotland, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 345–351. 
57 Colley, Britons,72–86. 
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consigned the dwindling but persistent Stuart claimants to irrelevancy in their historic 
stronghold. The threat of war and instability, and thus the weakening of the overall 
British system for the sake of narrow Scottish identity politics, was simply no longer 
attractive to most Scotsmen—even if they happened to be Catholic!58  
Interestingly, even those clans who had long sworn their fealty to the Jacobite 
opposition, ultimately found their way “home” to Britain. Fortunately for these past 
traitors, and for the British Empire, the demand for effective soldiers, military officers, 
and other skills abroad forced the Empire to value their service and gave these recent 
enemies the opportunity to redeem themselves, contribute to the British cause, and most 
importantly, gain wealth. The attraction of mutually beneficial profits among past 
enemies again became a powerful attraction to British multilateralism, so much so that 
Englishmen such as John Wilkes, a devoted anti-Scot, used the elevation of Scotsmen 
within the British empire as a core element of his political demagogy to attract English 
populist support for his own elections. The remnant separatism was popular for a while, 
particularly among the milieu that was not profiting directly from imperial expansion and 
that, as a result, was apt to regard the Scots as predators of jobs and status. Ultimately, 
however, Wilkes’s numbers dwindled and Britons came to think of themselves as a 
diverse but somehow unified nation.59 
D. BRITISH AMERICANS: FEAR AND ATTRACTION LOST 
The British multilateral system by the time of the American Revolution had 
become a nation at first because of the fear of Catholic power, foreign threats, and 
domestic instability, but the attraction came from the domestic stability and profits 
enhanced by being the greatest empire of its time. Importantly, all these achievements of 
power, wealth, and prestige originated from circumstances of female monarchs dying 
without heirs and the design of this powerful system was produced not in times of 
resolute strength, but from times of weakness, and the circumstance of those weak times 
demanded compromise, tolerance, and unity. Unfortunately for the Empire, Britain’s 
58 Ibid, 72–86.; Mitchison, A History of Scotland, 341–347. 
59 Colley, Britons,118–134. 
 28 
                                                 
power through multilateral unity had limits. The American Revolution demonstrated how 
fear and attraction were double-edged swords to British multilateralism, particularly in 
the colonial periphery. 
After the Seven Years War, 1756–1763, the British government found itself 
victorious over its French enemy in the New World but also found itself in enough debt 
to absorb five-eighths of its annual revenue in interest payments alone.   In order to 
alleviate the war’s tax burden, Parliament had to raise taxes and determined that subjects 
living the colonies needed to pay for their own defense. To British colonists in America 
the tax scheme looked like a demand for more central control—a kind of forcible 
attraction—while the French threat, and its inherent fear, appeared to be on the wane. In 
other words, both fear and attraction were at their ebb, which means the multilateral unity 
had little to sustain it. The result was the American Revolution.60 
Fear and attraction was also a prominent feature on the British end. Closer to 
home, the war put Britain on a war footing with France and Spain, two formidable 
Continental foes that presented an existential threat to London—while the American 
colonies clamored to retain their tax breaks and greater lawmaking autonomy. On top of 
this, while the profits generated from the Americas were significant, the Empire’s most 
lucrative profits came from India and thus the Empires real profit machine only became 
less secure with increased military commitment to the Americas. Essentially, the fear of 
an invasion on the British homeland, and the lowering attractiveness of holding on to the 
American colonies compared to further benefits elsewhere were not conducive to the 
British holding their formerly British American subjects within their multilateral system. 
In this sense, then, dwindling fear and attraction cut both ways at the fabric of British 
multilateralism.61 
Still, the American Revolution notwithstanding, British multilateralism must be 
noted as Western multilateralism’s most long-lasting, profound, and successful effort. 
60 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990) 202–204.; Robert Middlekauff, The 
Glorious Cause (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 590. 
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 29 
                                                 
Fear and attraction explain both the success and the one major failure that began in 1776; 
the results of fear and attraction create habits and norms that deepen the multilateral 
effort and make it something that overcome and lesson future centrifugal forces. In 
Britain’s case that system worked so well that it became something to defend over 
original differences within its original members. The reason British multilateralism 
remained—and remains—successful is because it remained relevant and beneficial to its 
English, Welsh, and Scottish members.62   
62 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 3–22. 
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III. POWER POLITICS’ RISE AND EUROPE’S ETHICAL 
DILEMMA 
In contrast to the British multilateral experience, continental Europe’s record from 
the 16th century to the close of World War I was more or less constant conflict caused by 
power politics. Why so?  What drove rulers constantly to choose war over peaceful 
means of advancing their countries’ interest?  After all, wars are expensive, messy, and 
bring risk of the rulers’ demise. Moreover, Europe’s staunch Christianity—with its 
famous pacifism—could have been expected to temper the aggressive motivations of 
European rulers and perhaps even inspire them to multilateralism within the broad 
context of a shared faith. While some elite thinkers of this turbulent time desired peace—
and an international order to facilitate it—the circumstances of this time and place made 
any grand alternatives from power politics unlikely except in very specific circumstances.   
Additionally, this was the zero-sum epoch of Europe. Land meant food, and food 
meant people, taxes, and goods for trade. People, in turn, meant armies and therefore land 
meant power, prestige, security, but land is a zero-sum commodity. Also, Europe never 
had its own capitalist enlightenment like the British where trade and business was a 
joining activity of perpetual self-reinforcing interest of aristocrat, tradesmen, producer, 
and government. While the British system had these things, and therefore the old 
kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Wales and all of their assorted subgroups had the 
motivational forces of profit—not to mention Protestant solidarity—Europe was a 
mixture of feudal and state systems more centered around hierarchal orders of rent-
seeking where those with power took from those without power with little concession if 
any. It was this zero-sum Continental environment that is partially to blame for Europe’s 
inability to give its leaders the fears and attractions necessary for multilateralism to work; 
simply, prosperity, peace, and the civilized rule of law necessary to bring benefits to all in 
Britain were the friends of multilateralism; on the other hand, zero-sum competition in 
Europe—domestically and internationally—was the enemy of multilateralism and was 
the friend of competition and power politics.63 
63 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 
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The motivations for the age of power politics in Europe were fear and attraction—
and likewise the forces that temporarily restrained power politics only at certain periods, 
namely after the French Revolution, and offered alternative international systems were 
also the fears and attractions of objective self-seeking rulers. Also, Europe’s path through 
enlightenment and modernity during this period affected European society at all levels 
and the enlightenment not only changed political circumstances, but the values of all 
Europeans as well. Therefore, rulers who lived in those developing circumstances made 
decisions based on self-interested fears and attractions created from those same 
circumstances. The opportunity for a peaceful multilateral system was also tied to those 
circumstances, because national rulers were ultimately what allowed multilateral 
arrangements to succeed or fail in the first place.64 
A. FAITH, ENLIGHTENMENT, AND RULERS 
The European Enlightenment was another force that transformed the nature of 
international conflict. Whether it was the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the rise 
of science, or the general changing ideas of God and man’s essence in the minds of 
commoner and elite alike, the Enlightenment had a nuanced but cumulatively profound 
effect on the actions and motivations of all in Europe. In the 16th and early 17th centuries 
the Enlightenment particularly began to change the roles of church and rulers.   
Immanuel Kant perhaps best defines Enlightenment as simply sapere aude, or 
“dare to know.” The proliferation of the printed word was the hallmark. The proliferation 
of print and other communications led man to question every old thought and everything 
was open to debate, provided a leader or institution was not so offended as to order the 
questioner’s imprisonment, exile, or execution. At the same time, crowned heads picked 
and chose among various opinions, religious and otherwise, to legitimize their rule and 
actions. For example, some enlightened opinions held kings were subordinate only to 
God, while others more conservatively viewed kingdoms as the Church’s daughters. If a 
king was directly legitimized by God, and not the Church, he could act against the 
64 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 6–7; Michael Burleigh, Earthly Powers (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2005), Kindle edition, chap. 1. 
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Church’s will. Additionally, given the religious fragmentations caused by the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, a king needed some philosophy or rationale, 
whether religious or worldly, to assure him that what he was doing was moral and right 
and that he was, indeed, the legitimate ruler of his regime. Not surprisingly, proponents 
of the various philosophies were all too willing to elevate the authority of monarchs in 
their writings so that their particular teachings were more likely to be accepted—and 
remunerated.65 
Amid the reconsiderations of the relationship of rulers and ruled to God, the 
church, and each other, religious schisms led to war. The Wars of Religion, 1569–1594, 
forced elite and commoner alike to choose sides, and the conflicts failed to resolve 
themselves geographically within the borders of kingdoms, not least because adherents to 
the “losing” creed or view inspired their self-appointed saviors in neighboring kingdoms 
to battle on their behalf. The only certainty was future conflict, change, and a re-
realignment of life in Europe at all levels of society. Therefore, rulers in this age had to 
choose among divergent paths. Some chose the old ways, hoping to garner the benefit of 
papal power, and more or less continued on the feudal path in terms of political and 
social organization; however, others sought stability in a reduced dependency on the 
Church, made the religious institutions within their country more subordinated to the 
crown, and adopted a Machiavellian emphasis on strengthening the state.66 
Europe’s new emerging states controlled more of their institutions and were less 
interdependent with the church; therefore, these states developed bureaucracies to fill the 
void. Not only that, but the nature of man and monarch changed in states. A king who 
was no longer reliant on divine (or at least church) approval also could not count 
anymore on the church as an absolute source of legitimacy and Monarchs now had to 
start compromising with landowning and other useful subjects to maintain loyalty and 
compliance. Some men began to have more rights, and kings became limited in their 
65 Burleigh, Earthly Powers, chap. 1. 
66 Ibid, chap. 1.; Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 6–12. 
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authority; monarchs had shed the Church’s authority only to have their own domestic 
authority over their subjects become less absolute.67 
At the same time, the multilateral European order, championed by so many cleric-
philosophers and often associated with the church, was weakened and state-centered 
conflict on the Machiavellian model became the norm because states were no longer 
restrained, or protected, by Papal politics. Multilateral security at this point was 
impossible because the multilateral Church was increasingly sidelined.68 
B. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, THE RISE OF STATES, AND A NEW 
DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM 
The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648, began as a localized conflict but turned into a 
European-wide war. The war began as an effort by the Catholic Habsburg dynasty to 
regain its lost Protestant possessions but the increasingly Machiavellian nature of 
European politics led nearly every nation to enter the conflict at one point or another, and 
the war’s religious justifications gave way to rulers’ political ambitions. France’s 
willingness to fight against other Catholic states—because political opportunities proved 
more advantageous to France than idealistic and religious loyalties—is but one example 
of this transformation.69  On the one hand, the war cemented the principle of “cuius 
regio, eius religio,” which had been articulated but by no means fully accepted at the 
1555 Peace of Augsburg, and ushered in an age of great-power politics in Europe along 
largely Machiavellian lines. On the other hand, the logic and experience of this age 
sowed the seeds, over the course of a century or so, of the next European multilateral 
experiment. 
Because the victors of the Thirty Years War were mostly states rather than feudal 
dynasties, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had more to do with entrenching the power of 
states to do as they pleased within their borders without the intrusion of the Church. This 
new way of operating was akin to a fences-between-neighbors policy, recognizing that all 
67 Burleigh, Earthly Powers, chap. 1.; Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 9–12. 
68 Burleigh, Earthly Powers, chap. 1.; Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 9–12. 
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states were sovereign and their rulers were equal or at least equally entitled to rule over 
their respective territories to the best of their abilities. However, peace did not follow 
because competition between these states still existed. Indeed, states’ ability to organize 
their internal affairs actually intensified the competition because their new capability to 
exploit exclusively their resources allowed more military capability. Historian Charles 
Tilly stated it best: “[W]ar made the state, and the state made war.”70 
This new international system brought forth aggressive power politics and a new 
kind of diplomacy. States’ goals in this new diplomatic system were to ensure their 
sovereignty by making alliances with other states to counter the power of present and 
potential rivals. In an environment where being alone was dangerous because isolation 
meant potential foes could team up and share the benefits of your destruction, it became 
more important for states to have friends, or at least allies, even if they had nothing else 
in common beyond a given rival.   For example, France’s Louis XIV once pursued 
alliances with Sweden and Muslim Turkey to discourage Russia from interfering with his 
ambitions of hand-picking a successor in Poland.71 
The new diplomacy was akin to a chess game, with each nation seeking present 
and future advantages for itself. Thus, it became advantageous to have diplomats who 
could manipulate the alignment of alliances to isolate future foes. In this system, the 
power a nation possessed determined the techniques of their diplomats; a powerful nation 
like France would create a series of alliances that would isolate one nation and prevent it 
from having allies so it could invade that weaker and lonely state at a time of French 
choosing. On the other hand, weaker states formed alliances to counter stronger nations 
to attempt to secure their own sovereignty.72 
70 Ibid, 10–13.; Jack Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in New Europe,” in The Cold War and After: 
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Not only did this system lead to wars for no aim other than increasing power, but 
the competition between states led rulers to demand ever more resources from their 
nations:  
From 1618 until 1721, a long series of raging wars changed the rank order 
of European states by exhausting some and exalting others. Virtually all of 
the major dynastic rivalries, religious differences, the drawing of borders, 
possession of cities and fortresses, trade routes and colonies, and 
ultimately the destinies of kingdoms and empires were decided by the use 
of armed force in war. At the beginning of the century, a European battle 
might involve as few as 25,000 troops on both sides. Within a few 
decades, France alone created an army of 400,000…. Only they [Great 
Power States] could defend themselves from external attack. Only they 
could convene peace settlements.73 
This environment made diplomats merely a part of war rather than war being part 
of international diplomacy; all that a state could possess or secure was based on the might 
of its armies and its alliances. Thus, the prospects of restraint or common security were 
not feasible or attractive to Europe’s various rulers. Peace simply had no force behind it. 
 French machinations in the War of Spanish Succession best highlight this 
environment. The War of Spanish Succession, waged between 1702 and 1714, started 
when the Spanish monarchy found itself without an heir to the throne; predictably the 
French Bourbon dynasty could not pass up the opportunity to bring Spanish lands into its 
possession. Before France could strike to its south, however, it had to secure its northern 
border. Louis XIV sent his army into the Netherlands to dissuade interference from other 
European nations by reminding his neighbors through his demonstration of martial force 
who Europe’s hegemon was.74 
This strong-arm technique backfired to the extent that the Grand Alliance was 
formed, a coalition of the Netherlands, Austria, Prussia, and England. After amassing a 
ground force of nearly 70,000 soldiers, the Grand Alliance defeated the French at 
Blenheim in 1704, Ramillies in 1706, and in several successive battles. Eventually, the 
French were forced to give up their Spanish ambitions and renounce all of their conquests 
73 Ibid, 7–8. 18. 
74 Ibid, 13–14, 18. 
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east of the Rhine River among other concessions in the 1713–1714 Treaty of Utrecht. At 
this point Europe recognized the power of weaker states combining to balance the power 
of a threatening hegemon.75 
While the thwarting of French domination was a major achievement of the Grand 
Alliance, it was the creation of a new conceptual force that transformed the nature of 
Western politics: peace enabled by the force of balancing. Even King Louis XIV 
embraced this conceptual power—despite his defeat!—and viewed it as a potential for 
peace. As for the rest of Europe, the balancing of power to prevent the domination of one 
state over others began to offer an attraction of potential security through multilateral 
means and—more importantly—all nations saw the feasibility of enjoying peace’s benefit 
while simultaneously defending their sovereignty. Perhaps peace could occur within, and 
actually be reinforced by Machiavellian urges if aggression was deterred by balancing 
and peace was indeed the interest of the state?  In other words, the fears and attractions of 
rulers could perhaps align with peace objectively—rationally, self-interestedly—rather 
than altruistically. This balancing allowed durable and widespread peace to become a 
possibility, especially when a costly war loomed fresh in rulers’ memories.76 
To be sure, this tentative enthusiasm for peace was still centered on the power that 
could be brought to bear by states because, as Frederick the Great would opine, 
“negotiations without arms produce as little impression as musical scores without 
instruments.”77 Thus, this short window for multilateral peace was doomed to fail. Rulers 
still had interest in using the state’s apparatus to internally build their power, and the fluid 
and volatile environment of European politics—which had monarchs dying without heirs 
and various states’ powers waxing and waning—still presented opportunities too good to 
be passed on by ambitious rulers. In other words, and despite the lessons learned from the 
Thirty Years War and the War of Spanish Succession, rulers’ fears and attractions still 
made multilateralism merely an altruistic desire rather than tool to be used beneficially to 
states’ interest.78 
75 Ibid, 18. 
76 Ibid, 18. 
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The Machiavellian trend continued in 1740 when Frederick the Great decided that 
the opportunity to conquer Silesia was too good to be missed because English, French, 
and Russian antagonisms would counterbalance each other and the likelihood of them 
entering a conflict seemed low because, as Frederick incorrectly surmised, the Great 
Powers would not risk war with one another over tiny Silesia. Frederick therefore 
decided: 
All this leads to the conclusion that we must occupy Silesia before the 
winter and then negotiate. When we are in possession we can negotiate 
with success.79 
Here the conceived motivations of balancing actually contributed to aggression; it 
was Frederick’s hope that the fear of war between Great Powers would work out in his 
favor and the invasion Austrian Silesia would be an easy acquisition. Much to Prussia’s 
surprise the nature of Europe at this time made Frederick’s sophisticated calculations a 
disaster to both his ambitions and any hope for peace based on balancing. The Great 
Powers intervened to enforce the pre-existing balance, which did not accord such size or 
mass to Prussia. Thus, much of Europe found itself thrown into the War of Austrian 
Succession lasting from 1740 to 1748 for myriad reasons, few or which had anything to 
do with Silesia in the first place. European politics was still based on power and therefore 
balancing was just another technique of power politics. Rulers still feared the rising 
power of other nations and were still attracted to the security that having more power 
provided.80 
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C. RESTRAINT’S PENDULUM: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION’S 
AFTERMATH TO WORLD WAR I 
Throughout the 18th century, whether it was the Seven Years War or France and 
Spain’s later entrance into the American Revolution to harm British interest, Europe was 
fully embroiled in power politics, abetted by the efficient war making apparatus of the 
bureaucratized European nation-state. However, the competitive nature of European 
power politics was leading continental Europe toward a new reality—one that found 
rulers not only threatened by invasions from other states, but also threatened by a force 
that presented new and powerful fears to European rulers—revolutions.81 
By the late 18th century French sovereign debt from the Seven Years War and the 
American Revolution, in addition to the costs of maintaining its hegemonic power, began 
to weaken the privileged first and second estates. The first estate was the monarch, the 
family of the monarch, and the clergy within the state; the second estate consisted of the 
aristocracy. While many nations of Europe’s old regimes had debt, the French elites 
sought to mitigate this debt while simultaneously maintaining the loyalty of the second 
estate by increasing taxes on the third estate—everybody else, from shopkeepers to 
lawyers to bureaucrats to farmers. In order to compensate the third estate for the new tax 
burden, the monarch granted his commoner subjects more liberties.82 
The French state also became more centralized. In order for the French monarch 
to keep his aristocratic second estate in line and loyal, he relieved the second estate of 
any meaningful roles in the kingdom buy luring them to Versailles to enjoy a good life of 
court politics that mostly consisted of social gatherings. Therefore, the actual running of 
the government was left to more educated and competent specialist within the third 
estate. Therefore, the running of the French state’s day-to-day affairs was largely 
executed by the third estate; however, the third estate was exposed to the ideas of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. When Rousseau concept of a social contract between state and people, 
and thus the idea that man is an individual with a stake in, and right under the state, the 
increased taxed burden on the third estate to reduce debt began to create a dangerous 
81 Ibid, 18–22. 
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passion. When that passion was empowered by a relatively liberal and civil rule of 
peasants, which allowed them to own land, pay taxes, and therefore acutely feel the brunt 
of bad financial governance, the French commoners decided to mobilize and ultimately 
unleashed their frustrations against their privileged rulers. More than merely a change of 
rulers, the French Revolution was a change of systems that successfully toppled 
aristocratic rule; this presented a new threat to ruling elites and had an enormous impact 
on the whole international European order.83   
The rest of Old Europe’s privileged rulers did not initially perceive the internal 
nature of the French Revolution as a threat to their own sovereignty but instead focused 
on increasing their own power through conquest and took advantage of the vacuum 
leftover from the French hegemon being destroyed internally. However, with a new 
enlightened ideology inflamed by hatred of aristocratic privilege, the French Revolution 
ended up being a bigger threat to European states than had ever existed previously thanks 
to revolutionary fervors across all of Europe’s commoners. The situation became a 
nightmare thanks to Napoleonic invasions greatly enabled by those same passions.84   
The French threat—military and social—was finally met by a coalition of state 
rulers determined to uphold the aristocratic status quo and ultimately prevailed in 1815 
with the final defeat of Napoleon. As often occurs after brutal wars, the forces of Old 
Europe desired restraint through diplomatic means; this time however, any new 
arrangement had to consider the threat of revolutions. Because the whole French disaster 
was initially caused by power politics, and thus the consequence of this led to the 
Revolution, Europe’s Great Powers (Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) recognized the 
power of what Clausewitz would later classify as the people’s passion.85 
The arming of large militaries made possible by the state’s organization combined 
with enlightened and revolutionary sentiments among Europe’s commoners did not make 
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a good combination. In other words, the combination of enlightenment, war’s fiscal and 
social demands, and large numbers of commoners armed for those wars was no longer an 
attractive option to rulers given the potential of another revolution. Therefore, 
multilateral restraint had its first legitimate opportunity to overcome past Machiavellian 
temptations of aggression like that of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great.86 
As a result of the 1814 Treaty of Chaumont, the Great Powers (Britain, Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia) committed themselves to the final defeat of Napoleon and laid a 
diplomatic structure to prevent the upheaval’s reoccurrence.87  This structure, known as 
the Congress System, aimed to maintain a balance of power for the sake of preventing 
large wars and make popular revolutions less likely.88 Although the formal structure of 
the Congress System quickly failed, its intent was carried on with the Concert of Europe 
(same original great powers with an aristocratic France included) and its intent was 
threefold.89  First, it established the desire of the great powers to limit the mobilization of 
armies to protect the current social order.90 Next, it established that nations should 
respect the right of their neighbors to take military defense measures; and finally, they 
held that issues of war should not be unilateral but diplomatically communicated 
throughout the Concert of Europe.91 
For 50 years, the multilateral bargain had solid results, and wars were small and 
contained. The reasons for the Concert of Europe’s success were threefold. First, the 
balancing of powers made any overly aggressive action by Great Powers unattractive 
because it could lead to a big war and enflame the peoples’ passion. Second, Europe was 
generally balanced in power, and each nation was willing to work in concert with other 
powers to prevent the aggrandizement of any single nation; for example, France would 
work with its British historical foe in order to counter an aggressive action against Russia 
86 Ibid, 24–32. 
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and then work with Russia to hold Britain in check when required. In other words, the 
motivations of all nations to prevent aggrandizement of its neighbors made aggression 
diplomatically risky; at times this even motivated some nations like Russia to take a pass 
on territorial gains fearing it would frighten its neighbors into uniting against it.92  
However, the Concert’s attraction to balance had a sinister element to it as well. 
The power balance in Europe was perhaps effective because it was satisfactory to the 
Great Powers, but the Great Powers alone. Part of the original plan put in place buffer 
states between Great Powers to keep from invading one another but the lessor powers 
found themselves being conquered. While the principle of balancing kept Great Powers 
from going to war, it should be considered that that the peace in this period was more 
likely due to the availability of low hanging fruit like weak European nations and non-
European colonial expansion. In other words, the Great Powers feared each other and 
large wars in general, but had other paths of least resistance to increase their own power 
through conquest without risking a large war.93    
The third reason for the Concert’s success was because the shared fear of peoples’ 
passions among aristocrats affected the size of states’ armies and every nation took extra 
caution not to arm its populace any more than necessary. Therefore, nations were not 
prepared for grand campaigns because they had small professional armies designed for 
small campaigns. Additionally, an aggressive increase of military force by any nation 
would only lead to an arms race by other nations and therefore leave all nations more 
vulnerable to revolutionary passions.94   
The ideal conditions that restrained European rulers were first lessened because of 
the strategic potential created by the Industrial Revolution and this change started a chain 
of circumstances that would ultimately make the Concert irrelevant. The Industrial 
Revolution enabled countries to finance, supply, and mobilize massive armies, and could 
do so under non-revolutionary conditions because nationalism was made possible by 
92 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 26–32. 
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advances in mass communication, railroads, urbanization, mass politics, and overall 
higher interconnectedness of national societies.95 Therefore, in order for a great power to 
maintain its relative power, it had to embrace the strategic potential of the Industrial 
Revolution for military purposes.96   
Rapid technical advances in weaponry along with the military applications of 
railroad and canned foods to move and sustain large armies, also forced rulers to forgo 
earlier mentalities of diplomatic restraint fearing they would be disadvantaged by rivals’ 
industrial military growth. Nations now had two choices: increase their own power and 
keep up with the European arms race or not do so and become irrelevant in the 
international system at best, or be conquered at worst.97   
This fluid and rapid change in the great powers’ industrial capability was 
prominent in the international game of politics. At the center of this game was Prussia 
because it sent a disturbing signal to the rest of Europe by demonstrating its aggressive 
nature and superior martial skills in 1870 when it soundly defeated France and occupied 
some of its territory.98 From this impressive and swift defeat of French forces and the 
unification of a German nation a year later, the importance of checking Germany’s power 
became a paramount realization to European powers. Where diplomatic efforts after the 
Napoleonic wars were centered on multilateral consultation between powers, the rise of 
Germany made Europe’s international system centered on fear of German power; 
ironically, Germany itself feared the potential of its isolation and in turn continued to 
increase its own power. France, seeing first-hand that is was inferior to Germany, sought 
and eventually acquired an alliance with Russia.99  Britain, also nervous of Germany’s 
power, informally aligned with the French in 1906.100  The choosing of strategic partners 
also benefitted Germany. The rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and in turn, 
95 Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 55, 57–58. 
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Serbia’s ties with Russia, allowed Germany to pick up an alliance with Austria-Hungary 
because they feared Russian invasion.101 Europe was “undoubtedly structured around 
two rival armed, and arming camps” and the principles of the Congress System and 
Concert of Europe had become irrelevant due to industrial military growth and the fear 
both sides of the German situation had of one another.102 
The structure of early 20th-century Europe alone did not plunge the great powers 
into war; however, the structure combined with rulers’ logical fears of invasion and 
attractions to security did. Speaking of the situation, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke 
said it best: “Woe to him who applies the torch to Europe, who is the first to throw the 
match into the powder cask.”103  A small Serbian terrorist organization provided that 
match.104 
After the Black Hand assassinated the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, 
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and Russia came to Serbia’s aid. Germany did 
not want Austria-Hungary to go to war but it did not matter; Austria-Hungary committed 
and Germany knew it could not stand idle and watch its only ally be quickly defeated by 
Russia. Once Berlin learned that Russia was mobilized to attack not only Austria-
Hungary but also Germany—a decision made largely on Russian domestic politics and 
irrational Slavic nostalgia—the Kaiser no other option than to declare war on the Franco-
Russian Alliance because that alliance could invade Germany from both east and west. 
From here the alliances used to balance Europe against the threat of Germany plunged it 
into World War I.105 
What must be noted is how the impact of the French Revolution, which made 
attractive consultation and restraint between nations, gave way to fears caused by the 
Industrial Revolution and the rise of Germany. All of Europe feared German power and 
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was not willing to risk their sovereignty to multilateral bargains of security and thus 
turned to secret military alliances; likewise, Germany had no trust in any institution 
outside its powerful military to maintain its own sovereignty and Western multilateralism 
once again proved irrelevant when it was needed most. In other words, the fears of 
Europe’s various rulers made them more attracted to power and secret alliances for 
security than that of the Concert’s multilateral security.106 
D. CONCLUSION 
The conflict of ideas originated in the 16th century between Machiavelli and his 
more conciliatory rivals ran a 400-year competition for influence, but it was the fear of 
foreign invasion and the attraction of military power that dominated the decisions of 
Europe’s rulers. Machiavelli essentially won; even when multilateral restraint did occur it 
was because of rational state interest and not because of any altruistic force originated 
from the spirit of Aquinas’ multilateral disciples. Only the French Revolution allowed 
European rulers to seek common cause out of self-interest because the risk of revolution 
gave rulers their most powerful incentive for restraint.107 
Fear rooted in uprisings was only temporary and the Industrial Revolution created 
new social conditions. Afterwards, social conditions enabled nationalism to take hold and 
allay earlier fears of revolution from the third estate. The emergence of nationalism 
during the Industrial Revolution allowed those same commoners, who once struck such 
fear into rulers that inter-state competition was forced to restrain itself, to become a 
compliant resource, allowing states to increase military power and once again address 
their fear of invasion with the attraction of military power over that of multilateral 
security.108 
The rise of nationalism, industrial military potential, and German power 
readjusted European rulers’ fears. They no longer considered the principles of the 
Concert of Europe to be beneficial, and the multilateral effort did not hold any relevance 
106 Ibid, 34. 
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to rulers in the approach to World War I. Nations instead had to pursue their security by 
methods of the Machiavellian “beast.”  World War I thus started, entrapped nations, and 
prolonged itself much in the same manner of the Thirty Years War, the War of Spanish 
Succession, and Europe’s myriad other conflicts motivated by power politics. The only 
difference between World War I and previous wars was not in rulers’ motivations and 
geopolitical tendencies—or any other adjustment in essential ideas about the basis of the 
European order—but rather the sheer killing power of industrial armies combined with 
nationalist passions. Thus, Europe once again was victim to circumstances based on its 
fears and attractions.109 
  
109 Ibid, 3–40.; Gray, War, Peace and International Relations, 69–83. 
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IV. EUROPE’S INTER-WAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS 
Word War I was a tragedy. It was a tragedy not merely because it ended roughly 
ten million lives and wrought destruction on cities and infrastructure, but because of the 
environment it created after its conclusion, one in which no way favored long lasting and 
effective multilateral solutions. Just as the Thirty Years War entrenched the objective 
state over the Church’s altruistic multilateral institution, and the Industrial Revolution 
replaced revolutionary fervor with nationalism, World War I created a true sense of 
antagonism among Western men and turned the achievements of enlightenment, like 
nationalism and reason, into such impediments to cooperation as racism, jingoism, and 
revenge. Furthermore, these perverted forms of enlightenment made any effort of 
multilateral peace and security futile, if not impossible.110 
The vengeance-laden integral nationalism that crawled out of the trenches in 1918 
resonated long after the war. Despite Woodrow Wilson’s increasingly lonely quest for a 
post-national order, national identities became the salient distinction between good and 
bad, right and wrong, and of superior or inferior men, races, and cultures. Whether it was 
French dislike of Germans for the destruction wrought on their land and people, or the 
German nationalists’ hate of Jews as a coping mechanism to explain why the superior 
Kultur failed to overcome its Great War enemies, the strength of nationalism during the 
interwar period formed for many Europeans an attraction to primordial and emotional 
social instincts over any civilizing forces of peace and prosperity. Therefore, the interwar 
period was unsuitable for multilateralism—even with democratic governance in most of 
the major players—because hate and other primitive social constructs made any civilizing 
force toward a common good or peaceful bargain between nations democratically 
unpopular and therefore unworkable.111  The wages of this failure were World War II, 
the Holocaust, and the near obliteration of Europe. 
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A. WOODROW WILSON, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND ALTRUISM’S 
ENDURING WEAKNESS 
Established in 1919 by the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations focused on 
collective security and open diplomacy that pitted a distinctly 20th-century liberalism 
against the Machiavellian status quo.112 Unfortunately, Machiavelli—or at least 
realpolitik—won. Wilson, and the United States for that matter, had nothing in common 
with the Europe or its leaders after the Great War. Where Europe had its infrastructure 
destroyed and its civilian populace exposed to total war, the United States had by and 
large avoided the domestic social repercussions of the war.113  As one French diplomat 
noted: “The old Europe that we had known in 1914…ceased to exist.”114  Europe was 
suffering from massive class, ethnic, and ideological conflicts—and sought answers to 
these problems in measures that diverged sharply from the altruistic supranationalism that 
Wilson espoused from the comfort of a powerhouse country largely untouched by war. 
Therefore, when Wilson put his original ideas for the League of Nations into play 
immediately following the war—altruistic and peace-seeking ideas along the lines of 
Aquinas’s disciples but in a more humanist rather than religious nature—European 
leaders (other than Vladimir Lenin) embraced them no further than was necessary to 
garner American support for their own ends, primarily funds for post-war recovery. 
Wilson wanted the League of Nations to be a body that would collectively stand up to 
aggression and support a common good based on his own unique version of early 20th 
century Kantian liberal values.115   
However, Europe had liberal values of another kind; to them, liberalism was the 
empowerment of the state and the Machiavellian world was one suitable to Europe’s 19th 
century in that the free flow of competition between states—whether it be commercial or 
by war—was a naturally occurring continuum of events dictated by the rational interest 
112 United Nations, History, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml [accessed February 
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of individual entities and not that of a centralized body like the Church or the arbitrary 
rule of aristocracy or monarchs.116  Wilson’s more 20th-century liberalism was 
something entirely different, however, in that it sought the benefit of all through 
international collaboration rather than competition; Wilson’s liberalism was also centered 
on parties satisfying their self-interest, but the means was one of paradox. Everybody had 
to sacrifice to something not their own to gain the collective benefits, and this mechanism 
likely seemed as crazy to other state leaders as ancient tribes sacrificing virgins so that 
the gods would provide bountiful crops. Wilson’s liberalism was to an extent a matter of 
faith to humanity and man-made institutions. Signally, Wilson aimed to have all nations 
commit to a common good, sacrifice a degree of sovereignty and money in the name of 
achieving a lasting peace and follow an empowered League’s collective direction with 
each nation’s security ensured collectively by the five victorious states rather than by 
secret alliances. While British interest was more multilateral than France’s—where the 
primary intention was to punish and weaken Germany—and other nations like Italy fell 
somewhere in the middle, Wilson’s goal of creating an international order met 
insurmountable resistance in the end. By the time a much-diminished League took up its 
work, Wilson’s altruistic aims of common security and common good were watered 
down by too many different nations’ divergent, often irreconcilable self-interests. The 
League’s arsenal for enforcing peace was practically limited to flowery rhetoric rather 
than firm commitments from members.117 
European nations, like Wilson, wanted peace for peace’s sake as well, but with 
the steep mountain of recovery ahead of them, they rationally focused on their narrow 
self-interest than the empowerment of the League. Whether this interest was articulated 
in terms of recovery or reparations, however, European nations needed the United States’ 
money and power; therefore, they had to compromise to a degree in order to receive 
assistance from the Americans to rebuild their nations and check the power of a 
potentially resurgent Germany.118     
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While the normative principles of the League promoted equality, multilateral 
security, peace, and liberal ideals, the fact that the victors aggressively punished 
Germany and retained their own pre-war colonial holdings made the whole affair seem 
ridiculous considering the League’s liberal rhetoric of “just and honorable relations 
between nations.”119  However, this ambition only applied in reality to victorious states 
and not “nations”—people of an shared historical identity—that still remained under 
colonial rule of European powers; in other words, the League’s most important members’ 
actions made the League’s normative rhetoric hypocritical to the fullest. The acme of 
rhetorical absurdity came when Wilson worked to defeat a proposed League provision to 
improve human and racial equality despite his earlier championing of a “war to make the 
world safe for democracy,” “justice,” and “equality of rights.”120  Accordingly, the 
Japanese labeled Wilson a hypocrite when the measure failed—though they, too, had 
their own purposes beyond a general appreciation for world peace.121 
On the other hand, the League pursued normative measures and successfully 
passed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war, in addition to agreeing to several 
naval limitation treaties. The American Secretariat to the League of Nations, Arthur 
Sweetser, noted at its 10-year anniversary the League had: resolved 18 political 
controversies, repatriated 400,000 prisoners of war, resettled over four million refugees, 
and allocated more than $400 million in loans for postwar reconstruction. Also, this 
multilateral effort agreed to the Young Plan and demonstrated a degree of foresight and 
pragmatism by reducing German reparations from $32 billion to $9 billion.122  
A breakthrough moment for the relative stability of the League system came with 
the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and the U.S.S.R. in 1922. This treaty settled 
outstanding borders disputes and normalized relations between the two nations, but more 
importantly, it allowed the potential collaboration of Europe’s two outcast nations to 
frighten the rest of Europe to soften its German antagonisms.123 Additionally, 
Washington continued to play the role of creditor much to Europe and Germany’s 
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benefit. This arrangement of supporting Europe with its recovery was somewhat 
functional for about a decade because of the United States’ dynamic economic growth in 
the 1920s allowed Washington and U.S. banks to handle their leadership burden by 
granting loans and other support.124   
The League’s beginning and its early success were tied into the fears and 
attractions of state leaders. The United States and European democracies did have an 
attraction to peace. The United States was also attracted to a European economy robust 
enough to foster trade. Europe on the other hand was attracted to receiving aid from the 
United States and therefore accepted at least some of Wilson’s proposals to keep the 
Americans involved in Europe’s rebuilding. Additionally, the nominal victors of the war 
had a fear of German power, so any international order that could assist in stunting its 
regrowth had appeal.125 
However, because Europe’s leaders were so attracted to punishing Germany—
largely due to democratic politics still held hostage by World War I nationalist 
passions—they continued their aggressive pursuit of reparations and territorial 
aggrandizement at Germany’s cost. These actions by World War I’s victors left the 
German people poor, insecure, and insulted. These conditions only benefited the most 
extreme and malignant forces within German society as radical communist and right-
wing parties increased in popularity among those Germans most affected by the enforced 
impoverishment of the postwar order: the poor and the former middle class that had 
become poor despite its obedient working and saving.126  As a result, and when 
American aid to Europe and Germany was severely reduced shortly before the Great 
Depression’s onset, Germany’s centrist government was further powerless to improve the 
lives of its people and made radical ideologies in the country all the more attractive to its 
people.127 
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B. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE DEMISE OF WILSON’S 
LIBERAL ALTRUISM  
What few multilateral successes that the League could claim began to diminish in 
1928, when the U.S. economy started to falter, moved toward protectionism, and cut aid 
to Germany; the situation became even more dire in 1929 after the American stock 
market crashed and the Great Depression gripped the industrialized world.128  Much like 
the Concert, the League was unable to keep up with the changing international climate, 
and the Great Depression, much like the Industrial Revolution, quickly undid the 
motivational force—however small—that had previously persuaded states to make 
decisions beneficial to the collective body. Existing financial pressures within Europe 
became worse; unemployment rose along with civil discontent, and both sides of the 
Atlantic embraced an ever more rigid protectionism as the way out. In the event, 
protectionism drove nations deeper in to economic malaise and weakened the multilateral 
system further as nations beggared their neighbors. The League’s wan attempt to curtail 
protection policies among member states in 1933 was literally too little too late.129  
Interwar economics represented a symptom, not a cause, of the League’s pending 
irrelevance. The real problem was the strain of mass politics, which no collection of 
debate-trained men in cylinder hats in the 1920s and 1930s could hope to manage or even 
well understand. Before the Industrial Revolution, the public had far less to do with 
international diplomacy and economic policies. When diplomats and leaders received 
news of a developing situation, they typically had plenty of time to make decisions—or 
deals with interlocutors who, nonetheless, probably had more in common with each 
other, whichever flag they served, than they did with the lower and middle classes of 
their own states.   Through the end of the 18th century, these professionals did not have 
to account for public opinion to a large extent. Therefore, diplomatic and economic 
specialists could make decisions rationally and accordingly to national interests.130 
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This diplomatic situation in the West began to change with the rise of mass 
politics and the technologies that enabled it over the course of the 19th century. By the 
dawn of the 20th century, newspapers, radio, other media, and an overall quicker news 
cycle intensified the effects of mass interest and participation in Europe’s many young 
democracies. Now government, including internal and foreign affairs, was no longer the 
exclusive purview of crowned heads, aristocrats, and men educated like them. The public 
followed the events of the day with varying levels of attention and understanding, 
throwing its collective shoulder to policies that typically promised short-term and/or local 
benefits at the cost of any system-sustaining largesse. Thus, all policymaking became 
political in the sense of capturing (or diverting) the mood of the masses. Politicians 
courted their constituencies with quick, popular (or populist) decisions. And despite the 
“war to end all wars” rhetoric of only a few years earlier, Western electorates after World 
War I wanted national glory for themselves and national humiliation for their fondest 
enemies. As the Depression wore on, more and more of “the people” came to prize 
prosperity and order over the endless talking and compromise of democracy. As such, 
they also came to seek easy answers.131 
This is not to say that Europeans did not want peace. World War I made them 
want peace as much as anybody; however, the efforts to achieve a lasting peaceful 
environment through multilateral measures could not come at the expense of defying the 
electorate’s nationalism, and therefore, the public could not accept the nuanced solutions 
of assisting a former foe for the sake of latter peace and shared prosperity. For example, a 
diplomatic specialist could recognize the internal instability and rise of extremism in 
Germany and advise politicians to grant assistance to its weak democratic government 
despite past antagonisms because its was in the national interest in addition to being in 
the interest of the international community to prevent radical movements from finding 
favor among Germans. Unfortunately, this calculus does not play well to an electorate 
taught to hate Germany during the World War I years; politicians had to choose between 
what was prudent or what was popular. More precisely, state leaders where attracted to 
131 Ibid, 30–36, 57–60. 
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staying in office, and as a result, were attracted to policies that were emotional and 
popular rather than practical and foresighted.132 
C. THE AGGRESSION OF JAPAN, THE RISE OF HITLER, AND THE 
EMASCULATION OF THE LEAGUE 
The Great Depression proved to be the beginning of the end of the League. 
Despite its efforts, the League found its multilateral strength sapped when the prosperity 
of the 1920s disappeared and the one body favorable to multilateralism, the United 
States, lacked the political will perform crisis management in international affairs—
diplomatically or economically—because Washington was in an economic crises of its 
own and its own domestic political forces proved to be economically beholden to beggar-
thy-neighbor electorates as well. As a result economic conditions allowed fascist 
movements to gain momentum within increasingly weak governments like Italy and 
Germany. Additionally, imperial Japan took the opportunity to pursue militant foreign 
policy goals and Western leaders found themselves suffering from a lack of political will 
caused by their own fears, primarily the fear of losing elections.133 
Japan demonstrated that one of the Achilles’ heels of multilateralism was political 
will. Much like Germany would do later, the Japanese began aggressive military 
operations in Manchuria while playing politics against those nations seeking collective 
security in the League. The strategy was simple: Wage war while speaking of peace. This 
“speaking of peace” while pursuing imperialism drove home two hard realities to 1930s 
multilateralism: peace-seeking nations did not have the available military means to deter 
a distant Japan; and the aversion to war in European and U.S. minds meant the West did 
not have the political will to refute the Japanese. Additionally, aggressor nations found 
that they could use the potential of future peace to provide an environment of 
appeasement; after all, politicians were attracted to being a voice of peace for electoral 
reasons and aggressiveness could go unpunished unless the electorates became fearful 
themselves.134 
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For example, the United States, Japan, Britain, France, and Germany all entered 
the February 1933 League-sponsored World Disarmament Conference (WDC) with 
different desires based on their particular situations, but they all faced overwhelming 
economic hardships. They all agreed that maintaining large militaries was expensive. 
Thus, mutual disarmament should have been attractive to all parties for no other reason 
than saving money; however, much like the lead-up to World War I, a sense of fear 
among nations concerning Germany, and Germany’s own insecurity, made the WDC 
another of the League’s failures. Germany, given the military restrictions imposed by the 
post-World War I settlement and the devastation of successive economic crises, sought 
common security by bringing all nations down to its lowly military level. Germany 
pointed to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles that stated disarmament of all nations was 
ultimate goal of the treaty and Germany was merely the starting point. Thus, Germany 
sought common security through military equality by proposing that all nations’ military 
power should be brought down to the German level. Britain, Italy, and the United States 
supported the plan but France struck it down.135 
France had different goals.136 Given America’s isolationist policies and Britain’s 
lack of desire for a bi-lateral protection pact, Paris put primacy on national defense and 
sought to ensure that its own military power exceeded Germany’s. As a result the French 
were not willing to disarm. On the other hand, blatant obstruction carried its own 
potential for diplomatic consequences among allies who were tiring of France’s insistent 
belligerence. Thus, Paris submitted an outlandish plan that would surely be rejected 
because it favored no one’s individual interest. Therefore, Paris had the cover of rejecting 
the German plan because its own plan was rejected. Paris chose this path with one 
primary motivation: it wanted to maintain status quo restrictions on Germany and not 
lose its temporary military superiority.137 
After the failure of the German and French plans, the U.S. plan called for a ban on 
all offensive weapons consisting of aircraft bombers, heavy mobile artillery, and tanks; 
the plan additionally sought a reduction of all defensive weapons by one-third. While 
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smaller nations supported this plan, nations with more military power did not. The 
meeting adjourned and Germans made clear they would not return to negotiations until 
their equality demands were met. The French left the meeting satisfied with maintaining 
the status quo blissfully unaware of its future consequence.138  
France’s decision to obstruct the WDC was partly from its desire to influence the 
German elections immediately following the conference and hoped the stalemate would 
provide a more reasonable German leader. That election however made evident that 
many German people had lost faith in liberal governance and Adolf Hitler was elected to 
power.139 Hitler promptly used the failed WDC negotiations to solidify his domestic 
political support and used the League’s ineptitude to legitimize the German military 
buildup. In a word, Hitler asserted that he could give the German people security that the 
League could not.140 
Other leaders did not necessarily fear Germany in 1933 because its military was 
still small; however, they feared war because their electorates hated the possibility of war 
more than they disliked Germany.141  As such, Germany was able to follow a similar 
path as that of Japan. It consistently circumvented disarmament treaties, occupied weak 
neighboring countries despite Germany’s temporarily weak military, used newly captured 
lands’ resources to build the German military machine, and actually use the League to its 
own benefit by counting on the power of appeasement that was firmly entrenched in 
Europe’s hearts and minds.142 
After Hitler came to power the attraction of appeasement led most politicians to 
appeal to their peace-seeking voters while Hitler, in turn, took maximum advantage of his 
enemies’ fear of war. The spirit of appeasement allowed the Führer to aggressively defy 
Germany’s postwar settlement, reclaim lost territories and annex others, and afterwards 
rampage through Poland before soundly defeating France and throwing the world into 
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World War II. Ironically, words of peace came from every politician’s mouth, including 
Hitler’s, all along the path to history’s next and most brutal war.143 
D. CONCLUSION 
What must be appreciated is how the attractions and fears of politicians affected 
the League’s design following World War I and continued to undermine multilateral 
security thereafter. Perhaps if not for democracy, or at least the mass-political aspects of 
20th century democracy in practice, national leaders after World War I would have 
rationally brought Germany back into a respectable position in the world order and would 
have recognized that a stable German state would have favored everyone’s interest. On 
the other hand, without democracies the League would have unlikely had its Wilsonian 
altruistic flavor and would have resembled the Concert more so than not. If the hatred 
that existed in the minds of Europeans as a result of World War I’s horror and the various 
state’s efforts to promote nationalism had not occurred, perhaps the League could have 
actually been liberal and electorates—and therefore politicians—would have been 
attracted to more pragmatic decisions that would have promoted international civilization 
over that of narrow national self-interest and dislike of Germany. That was not the case 
unfortunately. Instead, the conditions and circumstances created from World War I 
ironically created a perfect storm of an imprudent electorate’s dislike of “others.”  It took 
both socially constructed identities and democratic governance to cause politicians and 
national leaders to make unwise policies that led the economic protectionism before and 
following the Great Depression and led politicians to punish Germany despite the risk of 
it becoming a failed then fascist and aggressive state. All of this occurred because World 
War I’s unfortunate consequences and democratic influences on the decisions of state 
leaders. This caused foresight and prudence to be as irrelevant to politicians to the same 
extent that Aquinian altruism was irrelevant to rulers after the Thirty Years War.  
Before World War II democratic governance attracted politicians to punish 
Germany both geo-politically and economically; and after the rise of Hitler, politicians 
were attracted to appeasement because the public simply did not want war. Therefore, 
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appeasement ruled the day; but this attraction for appeasement was not Machiavellian, 
Aquinian, or any other idea as such because democratic politics had made those old 
paradigms anachronistic. Instead, the spirit of Machiavellianism was diffused from the 
state level down to the individual politician rather he was a legislative member or the 
executive.   
Ironically, Europe and the West would have been better off if the Machiavellian 
patterns of the past would have deterred Hitler from his earlier aggressions like the 
invasion of the Sudetenland. Even more ironically, all the previous moral dilemmas from 
Aquinas to Machiavelli to Wilson all lacked relevance to Europe’s various leaders; 
rather, elections gave politicians new fears because of a simple attraction to electoral 
success. Therefore, democracy contributed to the coming of World War II as much as any 
other factor. After all, it is easier to be reelected by telling a public what it wants to hear 
rather than hoping to change an electorate’s mind. 
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V. THE COLD WAR: BOLD BEGGAR STATES, BENIGN 
HEGEMONY, AND VIRTUOUS SELFISHNESS 
The situation following World War II finally created conditions favorable to 
multilateralism. This circumstance was not because nations learned lessons and wanted 
peace more than before, nor was it due to superior statecraft or any other genius to 
overcome to the suspicion of peace and multilateralism, although these things 
contributed. Rather, it was because of a transformation of relative power to the liberal 
United States and the communist U.S.S.R. combined with the weakness of Europe and 
the continents changed social environment. State leaders and politicians now had new 
fears and attractions. Furthermore, Europe could not maintain its political sovereignty 
without the United States, while the United States could not hope to contain the Soviet 
Union nor foster capitalism in the west and beyond without Europe’s military assistance 
and economic well-being. Now, the West had an “other” in form of the U.S.S.R to 
motivate cooperation and give disparate peoples a common self-interest every bit as 
much as Catholic France gave British Protestants reason to pursue common goals in an 
earlier time.144 
Additionally, where the Europeans in the past experienced class conflict and other 
divisions of society before and during the interwar period, post-World War II “free” 
Europe—which was not under dominion of the Soviets following World War II—found 
itself forced between two models of society and had to choose a path into its future and 
hopefully it could be one very different from its Machiavellian past. Furthermore, free 
Europe had to choose this path from a position of military and economic weakness after 
being ravaged by history’s deadliest war.145 
One path was communism to deal with Europe’s massive poverty, hunger, and 
social unrest following the war. The other path was the U.S.-oriented liberal model. 
144 Ryan Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action 
after the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006) 8–13.; Lauren, Force and 
Statecraft, 70–74. 
145 Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 1–10. 
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America’s free-market and consumer based economy had produced a living standard for 
its working class that would have made any socialist cringe at capitalism’s ability to 
make the American worker’s life so prosperous. Because of that American success, the 
European commoner had something different to be attracted to rather than the 
demagoguery of old-style European class warfare against their fellow capitalist 
countrymen. Instead, the working commoner could be attracted to having a higher 
standard of living in a system where the pie always grew, and class antagonisms made 
ever less sense. It was this transition of European commoner from an “other” hating 
nationalist or communist to a peace-loving consumer that gave the West a structural 
foundation favorable to multilateralism after World War II to the present in that it gave 
democratically chosen leaders the motivation to pursue peace over that of power.146 
More broadly, where in the past the moral conflict of power holders was between 
Machiavellian state interest versus a common good based on collective goods of security 
and peace—rather the common good was motivated by religious Aquinian thought or 
unique early 20th century liberal values— the West’s leaders now found themselves 
weighing the dilemma of how much their respective nation should contribute to the 
common good of defense or the narrow national interest of welfare spending. As in the 
inter-war period, free Europe’s leaders had to choose between popular or prudent 
decisions.147 
The changed nature of the European commoner, the rise of the United States and 
U.S.S.R, and the relative weakness of Europe in the post-World War II period were the 
primary reasons that centripetal forces of unity have been stronger than centrifugal ones; 
additionally and perhaps most importantly, it was this environment combined with the 
attraction of member states benefiting individually from NATO and the U.N. in these 
time periods that gave multilateralism its most important glue. Ironically, the potential 
that a state can benefit from another state pulling more of the load—rather it be common 
defense, security, or the promotion of peace and stability—that gave and still gives 
146 Ibid, 1–14. 
147 Wallace Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2003),  
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multilateralism its most powerful ability to stay relevant. In the past, present, and future, 
the United States has and will hold on to the hope that Europe will do more to pursue 
common interest, and likewise, Europe has and will continue to hope for the United 
States to do the same.148 
A. THE EUROPEAN COMMONER: FROM A NATIONALIST 
“MALTHUSIAN” TO A VIRTUOUS BRAT 
It is individual selfishness that explains how the European citizen changed his 
ideological instincts from one that stood for something intrinsic—nationalism, religion, 
and class justice to name a few—into materialism that affected the fears and attractions of 
politicians and paved the way for electoral forces to benefit peace and multilateralism 
rather than democracy being a contributory force to future wars like it did during the 
interwar period. After all, war prevents one from enjoying the joys of television or 
movies and absorbs industrial and financial capabilities that otherwise might make 
mechanical servants such as dishwashers, clothes dryers, and washing machines. 
Therefore, to the commoner, big wars for whatever reason, just or not, disrupt the 
machine of free trade that makes his life convenient and enjoyable. This virtuous 
selfishness also goes beyond war, as it also contributed to domestic stability and 
tranquility. As with war and normative things like nationalism, selfish materialism 
softened the effect of class warfare in Europe. After all, who cares how much more others 
have if simple worker can afford to have things even the wealthier classes couldn’t have 
possessed only two or three decades before.149 
The standard of living in Europe and the United States during the 1920s differed 
starkly and explains why European society—nationalist, poor, and rife with class 
conflict—had so many more problems than its American counterpart until the post-World 
War II environment. For example, in 1929 the average American worker in Detroit 
annually bought “five shirts, two ties, two cotton union suits, fourteen pairs of cotton 
socks… one pair of suspenders, two pairs of shoes, two pairs of leather and nine pairs of 
148 Thies, Friendly Rivals, 255–260, 280–284. 
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cotton work gloves.”150  What the typical Detroit factory workers wife bought was more 
impressive and what she bought for her typical two children on average went even 
further. The lady of the house would renew her entire wardrobe every two years with a 
variety of dresses, eight pairs of stockings, multiple nightgowns, and at least two pairs of 
shoes; the children benefited even more with the average family spending one-twentieth 
of their annual budget on the youngsters’ apparel.151  Meanwhile, the average European 
working-class family’s clothes were almost entirely homemade or handed down. Not 
only that, but American families’ clothes were higher in quantity and quality, and were 
stylish enough that working-class Americans often had better wardrobes than all of 
Europe, excluding the most privileged of European classes.152   
This relative prosperity also went beyond clothes. Most American families had a 
kitchen, running water, electricity, and enjoyed a variety of affordable cosmetics and 
personal hygiene products that made them different from their European counterparts in 
more than just appearance and lifestyle, but also scent. In Europe these living conditions 
was something only the wealthier citizens enjoyed. Moreover, these living conditions 
were achieved with only a small minority of American workers unionized. Indeed, the 
most affluent blue-collar Americans worked for the Ford Motor Company, which was not 
unionized, and this point was perhaps most surprising to Europeans. Additionally, where 
most European workers could not dream of having a car, about half of Americans not 
only owned one, but many had new cars because the Model T was only about $440 
during the 1920s and thus was affordable to the masses. While the American standard of 
living dropped drastically in the Great Depression, it later recovered during World War II 
and a destroyed Europe could not help but notice how America’s capitalist ways 
benefited its citizens despite background or class. Europe’s transition to this American 
way of mass consumerism and social organization allowed Europe to move from its 
combative competitions of the past into a more benign desire of Europeans to have more 
stuff.153 
150 Ibid, 88. 
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Both the elite politician and the commoner were in two different kinds of conflict 
in pre-World War II Europe, and both of these conflicts can be considered a “Malthusian 
vise,” where the world was seen as a zero-sum game rather it be geopolitical affairs or 
matters of domestic class distinction. Because of the vise, and a overbearing instinct to 
distinguish “we” and “others” at all levels from nation-states to domestic classes, Europe 
was segmented and did not have a singular market necessary for mass consumerism—
where products are made to sell to a whole society—because every social group and 
nation sought to distinguish itself as separate and better than national or domestic 
“others” and sought to gain the upper hand at the “others’” expense. On the international 
scene this dynamic primed France and Britain’s treatment of democratic Germany during 
the interwar period. At the domestic level this segmentation was done between classes 
and political groups. What they all had in common was a zero-sum mentality.154 
Such fundamental zero-sum extremism in all things fueled the non- or anti-
democratic movements of the time. Because liberalism and consumerism would allow all 
to have better life, Hitler declared himself opposed to both because when people “want to 
lead a life like others and cannot,” he could couch their needs as the “bread of survival,” 
a hunger that could only be slaked by the “fruit of war.”155 In other words, mass 
consumerism and a higher standard of living through economic growth rather than taking 
it from others would slacken Hitler’s appeal; not only was he well aware of this, but it 
was his nationalistic, anti-liberal, and anti-communist stance that made the German 
Mitelstand perfect Nazis. Victoria de Grazia in Irresistible Empire best explains why:  
Drawn from the artisan economy, state bureaucracies, and the modern 
service sector, their incomes often differed little from the wages of the 
unionized, skilled working classes, though in terms of lifestyle and mental 
habits they couldn’t live like workers, any more than they or their wives 
could engage in manual labor. It was their intimate distress about the 
crumbling hierarchies of the old regime of consumption that made of an 
emotional war zone, and their fear of losing this struggle with a Medusa-
154 Ibid, 77. 
155 Ibid, 76. 
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like enemy—the workers, America, the rich, the Jew—that pitched them 
onto the side of reactionaries in the 1930s.156 
Therefore, it was the class segmentation in Europe combined with combative 
ideologies and economic depression that allowed the most aggressive and detrimental 
groups to come to power within nations like Germany. Obviously, these groups had no 
interest in reducing conflict with multilateral and conciliatory measures, but instead, 
needed conflict to elevate their own “we” group at the expense of “others” and justify 
their own elite rule by the presence of conflict itself.157 
After World War II this situation changed. Europe was destroyed, its social 
classes were similarly miserable and a whole generation of young men was decimated, 
and that was in the lucky countries. Others, like Soviet-occupied Germany and Eastern 
Europe, found themselves even more devastated; Berlin alone saw 110,000 women raped 
upon its fall to Soviet forces.158  Whatever the new age portended, the old Europe with its 
global preeminence and the conflict-riven society that roiled beneath the pre-war 
prosperity was gone. 
While Europe’s problems were astounding at the close of World War II, it was 
also this fresh starting point and the necessities this destruction demanded that ultimately 
allowed free Europe to remake its self and its values. Sir William Beveridge’s 1942 
description of Britain could have been applied to all of post-World War II Europe; it was 
a society filed by five “social evils” being “illness, ignorance, disease, squalor, and want” 
and nothing else than universal health care and education, subsidized housing, and 
government insurance for unemployment would hold their war-torn societies together.159 
But the same force that led to Europe’s welfare state direction also led to open and free 
markets: everyone just wanted a decent and higher standard of living. Perhaps it was the 
misery of the worst war in history that changed formally competitive paradigms. The 
desires to glorify the nation or cause—whether it be communist, fascist, or any other 
156 Ibid, 110. 
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ideological paradigm—fell into perspective after Europeans witnessed the hell they and 
their children had suffered and politicians in the United States and Europe both realized 
that elevating people’s standard of living was a vital need.160  Therefore, everyone—from 
U.S. presidents to European parliament members—was attracted to electoral success, 
facilitated by bigger slices of the growing pie for the electorate, and practical measures of 
prosperity became more attractive policies than ideology and conflict.   
American style business practices quickly infiltrated a new welfare Europe and 
Europe’s new value of a decent standard of living for all assisted in giving the continent a 
more homogeneous market for those same American business practices. As a result, 
Europe became more commercially American than they were willing to admit.161 
Not only did these consumer trends affect economics, but they transformed social 
life within Europe and the values we now associate with progress, like gender equality. 
After all, if European women ware capable of choosing between different washing 
machines or shampoo, why would they not become choosier in other avenues of life?  
More importantly, Miss Europe voted and the following question had to be in the mind of 
European politicians: “Would it not be better to compete in the relative merits of washing 
machines than in the strength of rockets?”162  
Ultimately, America’s market empire changed the nature of identities. In the past 
one’s identity was where he stood in the Malthusian zero-sum conflict, now one’s 
identity—whether it be a housewife, worker, business man, or sports fan—was not an 
identity of conflict, but a segment of a market that businesses strove to satisfy in order to 
earn their money.163 Essentially, America’s market empire changed Europe and gave the 
common European a selfish but virtuous desire for more consumer goods instead of 
desiring more power; furthermore, more stuff through divisions of labor requires more 
international cooperation to foster free markets. Conversely, expensive wars keep people 
in a free-market system from having more stuff; therefore, multilateralism was attractive 
160 Ibid, 340–341. 
161 Ibid, 342–349. 
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and prosperity was a bottom up force that motivated politicians to cooperate 
internationally. 
America’s market empire as a matter of financial practice by itself was not a 
contributory force to multilateralism; however, its socialization of the values among 
Western people was. Whether it was the French communist or the die-hard maintainer of 
French Empire in Algeria or Asian colonies, the difficulty of pursuing realpolitik amidst a 
new age of female empowerment and the desire for a better life for all—all things 
socialized intrinsically by desire for mass-consumer goods—made the old ways of 
Malthusian advantages acquired through political and military force not only 
anachronistic and out-of-style with developing European attitudes, but in many ways, 
became immoral to voters and accordingly to their politicians. Simply, to the individuals 
dedicated to such intrinsic and nearly spiritual pursuits of ideology, whether it be 
communist or nationalist, faced a new reality that made their Malthusian goals a path of 
most resistance if not downright impossible against the immediate and constant desires of 
a housewife to have a new washing machine or the worker buying a new car while 
simultaneously doing their own part to produce consumer goods themselves in order to 
earn a wage. Signally, these Malthusian warriors lost political power, and the will to 
pursue those zero-sum goals for that matter. 
Furthermore, Market Empire made Europe more American and free Europe took 
up a free-market and individual liberty based identity that contrasted itself against the 
Soviet East as much as Protestantism in Britain created a common bond among former 
English and Scottish foes against their common Catholic foe in an earlier time. This was 
a change of worldviews to the French and German commoner or politician and in a sense 
was a replacement ideology—of individual liberty and well-being—over that of class or 
national aggrandizement and glory. Now, the purpose of the state was for the benefit and 
protection of individual, not the individual for the aggrandizement of the collective cause 
of nation. This western ideology of the individual—whether the individual be man, 
woman, Jew, Christian, capitalist, or worker—was a moral political force more powerful 
than Aquinas could have ever hoped to achieve. As such, with every individual action—
the worker buying the car, the woman choosing from multiple brands of shampoo, or any 
 66 
other individual decision made under the capitalist market empire—the work and 
sacrifice necessary to pursue any other Malthusian option became absurd as bloodletting 
to cure sickness. In essence, Market Empire—like British Protestantism—gave the West 
a deep and broad cultural acceptance of a common identity, cause, and a moral code 
worth defending with war if necessary…at least if the United States would assist. 
Because of Market Empire, the West became a liberal “we” distinct from the illiberal 
Soviet “other” as a matter of both essence and ideology; a commonality necessary for 
multilateralism to survive its constant challenges. 
B. THE UNITED NATIONS 
The international situation following World War II reinforced this new pacific 
nature of the West and made international multilateral efforts attractive because it 
addressed the fear of three nightmare scenarios: Europe falling into its old power politic 
ways, Soviet domination, and nuclear war. After all, the new peaceful nature of new 
Europe mattered little if it fell under the Communist or was caught in a nuclear exchange 
between the two superpowers. Therefore, multilateral institutions were the only way 
Europe could prevent the worst case—any worst case. Multilateralism also promised to 
keep Europe from being completely subservient to American hegemony.164 
The waning stages of World War II forced the United States to recognize that its 
past isolationist tendencies would only lead to future calamities. It was Roosevelt’s wish 
to have an international body to police the world and ensure norms of peace were obeyed 
not through altruistic agreements, but by the threat of force that only the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and Britain could provide in order to deter later repeats of past 
aggressions. By the same token, however, the great-powers model would not suffice. 
Essentially, all nations and peoples had suffered and all wanted a say in any new 
organization that would foster peace. Additionally, the normative pressures of the time in 
the West dictated that a new order had to be democratic in nature.165   
164 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 69–75. 
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Therefore, public support combined with the horrors of war made the most 
agreeable solution the formation of a new organization, one more powerful than the 
League, that all nations could join and replace past systems like power balancing and 
secret alliances. So, the general concept of the United Nations deviated from that of the 
League in that peace would not be pursued through international disarmament, but rather, 
peace would be enforced by the threat of force and the use of diplomacy to guide that 
force.166  Accordingly, states joining the United Nations agreed to “refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” and “to unite our strength to maintain international 
peace and security, and to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of 
methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”167 
Human rights also played a major role. With the horrors of the war fresh in living 
memory, the abuse of human rights emerged as a security threat to all because leaders 
who achieved power through violating human rights to gain and maintain power were 
more likely to threaten their neighbors upon consolidation of national power. 
Additionally, poor economic conditions were seen as a precondition to such dangerous 
leaders gaining power. Essentially, restraint, human rights, and prosperity became 
something to be enforced, fostered, and were something as vital to international security 
as that of warships and tanks. Given that both of these circumstances was directed at the 
state level and human dignity and welfare were so important to maintaining security, it 
was almost as if the original framework of the United Nations had finally given Aquinas 
his way because his values were now enforceable international norms.168 
However, the diplomatic renaissance after World War II quickly was subdued by 
real world events. States still acted on their narrow self-interest and violated the U.N. 
charter if they believed the international body would not stop them. The Soviet Union 
clearly advertised its true colors and dominated Eastern Europe. The British and French 
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held onto their colonial holding despite the U.N. charters emphasis on human rights and 
democracy, and the United States moved unilaterally in recognizing the statehood of 
Israel despite a lack of international consensus and did not even attempt to reach it for 
that matter. However, because the West was the creator and self-proclaimed enforcer of 
the rules, these values of democracy, security, self-determination, and human rights 
gained power nonetheless. Decolonization continued to occur due to European weakness 
and America’s desire. Accordingly, weak states entered the U.N. after their 
decolonization and used the West’s own principles—once used to champion the West’s 
cause against Hitler—to diplomatically counter their former colonial oppressors.169 
Similarly, when the Soviet Union or any other illiberal nation found themselves criticized 
by the United States concerning human rights in the 1940s through 1960s, all the illiberal 
dictators had to do was point to the treatment of black citizens within the United 
States.170  In other words, the benign values of the West became rhetorical weapons for 
all.171   
Human rights as a political force gained even more power when the United 
Nations—via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—created numerous agencies to 
expose and punish violations of various countries. In this way the United Nations 
changed the nature of international affairs and human rights regulations attracted some 
leaders to use violations of other states to their own political benefit while other nations 
felt pressure to change their own behavior because they feared the criticism of other 
nations.172  
However, there were still strong forces of attraction to the U.N. as a body. The 
richer and more powerful West wanted the body there to prevent a return to power 
politics and weaker nations wanted the United Nations so that they could punch above 
their weight and influence international politics in a way that could never occur 
169 Ibid, 70–79.   
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otherwise. Another attraction was the ability of the United Nations to allow heads of 
states to save face in dire circumstances and back out of situations they had, to a degree, 
created for themselves. For instance, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis began when the 
Soviets emplaced medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from the U.S. 
coast. Neither of the superpowers had any interest in allowing the crisis to escalate into 
nuclear war; however, with both sides fearing that any sign of weakness or compromise 
would signal an opportunity for the other to be more aggressive, the situation ground into 
a stalemate with clearly annihilatory implications. Fortunately, UN Secretary General U 
Thant communicated with the United States, the Soviets, and Cuba and worked out a 
compromise that did not require or allow any party to take credit or blame—
internationally or at home. While the fear of nuclear war from both superpower 
adversaries made Thant’s compromise possible—which consisted of removing Soviet 
missiles from Cuba and American missiles from Turkey—the fear of both superpowers 
losing their bargaining leverage against one another in the future gave the existence of an 
international body an attractive way for leaders to back out of a crisis they had caused 
themselves. In other words, the United Nations was attractive because it gave peace a 
chance even after the Soviet superpower miscalculated and brought the world to the brink 
of nuclear warfare.173 
Even though no nation will get everything it wants out of the United Nations, that 
loss is not as costly as the alternative of power politics and the military preparedness it 
necessitates. In light of the U.N.’s ability to spread values, resolve disputes, promote 
humanitarian aid and international trade, all of its shortcomings cannot diminish the 
order’s value because the body is only capable of what its sovereign member states allow. 
Whether it was the fear of power politics, nuclear war, or domination of a super power, 
the relevancy and benefit of the United Nations must be recognized as successful 
primarily because of the attractive, multilateral alternative it offers its member state 
leaders and politicians—however powerful their states may or may not be.   
173 Ibid, 82.; Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, 61–62. 
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C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
 For the first half century of the United Nations, the Security Council failed 
to live up to the founders’ hopes, as its permanent members—the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China among them—sat on different sides of the Cold War divide. 
With these hopes dashed, no other multilateral effort demonstrates the importance of state 
leaders’ fears and attractions more so than NATO. The threat of the Soviet Union and its 
clear disregard for the Western values of the United Nations were the main catalyst for 
the formation and continued development of NATO throughout the Cold War.174  That 
fear of Soviet domination and the reality that the United Nations alone could not do much 
to check such aggression prompted some old-fashioned balancing to protect the 
democratic West. Such events as the Berlin Crisis of 1948 and the Korean Crisis in 1950 
were all the more frightening because the left-over Soviet military power at the end of 
World War II contrasted menacingly with the relative weakness of Europe. Thus, NATO 
was wrought, in the first instance, of the fear shared by Europe and the United States. 
This fear had a nuclear nuance—and an existential charge. Therefore, NATO became an 
organization to prevent war even more so than one to defeat the Soviet Union.175  With 
the defense policies and practices of the member states intertwined and interdependent, 
NATO emerged as perhaps the signal multilateral success story. 
To be sure, member state actions—an ambivalent series of dances around 
deterrence, risk shifting, and burden sharing—demonstrate state interest was paramount 
and that the only reason that the organization existed was because of the fears and 
attractions of its member states. NATO was not a simple case of the West’s “we” against 
the Communist “others”; the West’s “we” states also competed with each other. Each 
NATO state fought to ensure that it received maximum protection against the communist 
giant while simultaneously foisting as many costs onto the other members, each 
protesting that it was already doing all that it could manage politically or economically.  
Additionally, each nation strove to ensure that it had maximum influence in the direction 
and decision making in NATO because they all feared two things: diplomatic 
174 Lauren, Force and Statecraft, 75. 
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marginalization and other nations bringing them to war with the Soviets.    None of the 
members wanted (or want) to see the alliance diminished, but all of them had 
constituencies at home that typically did not put much priority on the esoteric workings 
of collective defense. As such, the alliance eventuated as a collection of distinct and 
discrete nations that share certain key fears and attractions.176 
At the same time, NATO managed to bring the diverse parts of the West together, 
even as the logic of burden-shifting seemed to drive them apart. From the U.S. 
perspective, the Soviet Union was a threat but could be countered with nuclear 
superiority for the time being. However, Washington could deter the Soviet Union over 
the long run and hope to win the ideological battle of liberty versus centrally directed 
equality only if the free nations of Europe and North America had the robust economic 
health necessary to pay for a suitably capable force.177  This calculus was complicated, in 
the U.S. view, by the tenuous economic health and military capability of its allies. 
European states could not rebuild their armed forces faster than their fragile, post-war 
economies could provide. Europe could ill afford massive armies and nuclear arsenals—
though these great-power trappings retained some allure for the larger western European 
states. The United States came to direct most of NATO’s nuclear deterrence and 
contingency planning, while Europe was left to go along, often grumbling. In the end, 
Europe was attracted to American aid and security, and the United States was attracted to 
having a healthy free Europe that could sustain a lively trade and afford capable enough 
militaries to counter the Soviet threat, remove the need for U.S. forces in Europe, and 
ideally, keep any potential war on the other side of the Atlantic. Essentially, America 
needed Europe to be a nuclear-armed tripwire against the Soviet Union.178 
Europe remained skeptical of the level of U.S. commitment. The initial U.S. and 
British strategy, which was made clearly from strategic self-interest, consisted of allies 
retreating to buy time for a future Normandy-style invasion to retake Europe. Not 
surprisingly, this plan aroused more insecurity among the other allies because it would 
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once again leave Europe conquered and devastated. After the potential political crisis of 
this situation became apparent, Washington finally moved to a front-line defensive 
strategy combined with nuclear strikes against Soviet forces and population centers with 
OPLAN OFFTACKLE in 1949.179   
The theater-level military planning was only half of the allies’ problem because 
the rearmament of Germany was another issue that seemed doomed to deadlock progress 
of the alliance.   France did not want West Germany rearmed out of fear; many elites in 
West Germany did not want to join NATO as membership would ensure the permanent 
division of greater Germany. But the United States wanted Germany armed so that more 
of the defense burden could be shifted to Europe. The French were already at odds with 
American political hegemony concerning the decision-making of Europe’s security; after 
all, why enable the German threat when the Soviet threat is deterred by American nuclear 
weapons?  The Americans wanted to avoid long-term heavy commitments to Europe but 
at the same time dismissed French demands of European determination and only tacitly 
pursued the German issue out of fear of alienating France; on the other hand, the French 
would not strengthen the European pillar by rearming the Federal Republic of 
Germany.180 America feared over-commitment and European dependence; conversely, 
France feared Germany, American hegemony within NATO, and the possibility of being 
overrun by the Soviets while the U.S. and Britain prepared for another Operation 
Overlord that may or may not happen after France was destroyed thrice in a century.  
Fortunately—and unfortunately at the same time—the Korean War adjusted the 
previous held paradigms and new fears allowed NATO to finally overcome previously 
impassible self-interest.181 The ultimate change of NATO paradigms after the Korean 
invasion was based on a lost sense of security centered on simple and economically 
efficient nuclear deterrence. If American nuclear weapons did not deter North Korea—
and because the United States choose not to use them during the conflict—nuclear 
weapons might not deter the Soviet Union either. Now France realized that the German 
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issue was not as paramount as it once thought and opened to the possibility of rearming 
its eastern neighbor as part of the European Defense Community (EDC) that allowed for 
rearmament under a multilateral command structure.  Although the EDC ultimately failed 
when the French vetoed their plan, it did change the French paradigm enough to later 
include German rearmament under the NATO integrated command structure in 1955.182  
The Korean invasion also made German fear of invasion more important than the 
reunification of their country. Additionally, the Korean invasion prompted the United 
States to deemphasize its dreams of a limited presence in Europe in favor of its strategic 
European tripwire, and the United States committed more heavily to European defense. 
Perhaps NATO headquarters should have a statue of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung 
out front, for without his invasion of South Korea, NATO nations’ fears and attractions 
may have never aligned enough to make the alliance what it became.183 
Because the Soviets had proven themselves technically proficient beyond 
expectations in the development strategic arms with their detonation of the hydrogen 
bomb in 1953 (a scant year after the Americans’ first detonation) and then the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957, the allies felt increasingly insecure. This environment allowed for a 
greater acceptance of U.S. hegemony in NATO, to France’s dismay. In its turn, the 
United States placed massive numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe under NATO 
control. While this move did involve some polemics, the controversy over the 
political/military and European/American control of the nuclear weapons was closer to 
convergence than any other NATO crises because fear was at such a high point. What 
made all other nations willing to accept this new vision of massive retaliation was the 
elite Zeitgeist of military austerity in favor of rebuilding European economies, and the 
realization that NATO conventional forces had no hope of victory because Soviet 
conventional forces dwarfed them.   
This allied consensus on massive retaliation soon proved unable to survive the 
fear caused by the Cuban Missile Crises and the subsequent advent of “flexible 
182 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, Chap. 2–3, Kindle edition. 
183 Ibid, Chap. 2–3, Kindle edition. 
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response.”184 What Kennedy interpreted as raising the threshold for nuclear war 
Europe—particularly France—interpreted as America weakening its commitment to 
Europe. In de Gaulle’s famous calculus, the United States seemed unlikely to sacrifice 
New York for Berlin or Paris. Then came the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which the French 
viewed as a move by Washington to prevent France from further development of its own 
nuclear weapons in an American effort to monopolize NATO nuclear politics. The 
Franco-American divergence, among other events, led France to leave the command 
structure.   
The military and political consequence of flexible response is best understood by 
examining the views and actions of several key personalities and nations concerning risk 
and burden-shifting. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO 
from 1956 to 1963, had several misgivings about the Kennedy strategy and the oncoming 
crisis the alliance would have to face in the near future. A series of memoranda captured 
Norstad’s reservations: Allied conventional forces will never match up to the Soviet 
horde; the desired build-up of conventional forces was too expensive and unsustainable; 
the strategic move to provide an escalation—or pause—before massive nuclear retaliation 
weakened the level of deterrence and thus increased the chance of war; flexible response 
weakened allies faith in U.S. determination; and the best advantage that the United States 
had was its nuclear advantage and Washington should take full advantage of this 
deterrence. Although Kennedy ultimately rejected Norstad’s advice, the diagnosis of 
“over-optimism” about flexible response was a predictor of crises yet to be exacerbated 
in inter-NATO relations throughout the remainder of the Cold War.185 
The desired increase of military forces and weakening of nuclear resolve by 
Kennedy against Soviet “salami slicing”186 led to an increased sense of insecurity in 
other NATO allies. While these insecurities existed beforehand and were factors merely 
held dormant before the change of strategy, the consequence made NATO an inter-allied 
184 Ibid, Chap. 4, Kindle edition. 
185 Jordan, Norstad, 184–188. 
186 “Salami slicing” was a fear that the Soviet Union would slowly take over Europe by only violating 
NATO countries’ sovereignty a little bit at a time in so that the fear of escalation would prevent significant 
retaliation from NATO allies. 
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competition of deflecting risk.  “Each member [had] sought to ensure that it would not 
have to fight alone, yet each has also hoped that any fighting would be kept as for from 
its own territory as possible.”187 This pursuit of national interest within the alliance led to 
deadlock and damaged trust among allies. The advent of flexible response had the United 
States using Europe as a “firebreak,” ensuring a war would remain in Europe and not 
threaten U.S. territory with ICBMs. Europe, on the other hand, wanted American skin in 
the game to ensure it met the same fate as its allies to ensure commitment; Europeans 
were afraid that a slow and deliberate escalation of general war would allow Europe to be 
overrun and tempt Washington to sit it out.188 
The constant push and pull of alliance unity throughout the Cold War made 
NATO an ambivalent balance of managing national leaders fears and attractions. 
Whether it was later medium range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter Soviet threats or 
the strategic implications of détente were each nation sacrificed alliance unity to 
normalize relations with the U.S.S.R, European nations seemingly chose to do just 
enough to maintain Washington’s security umbrella while at the same time minimizing 
their own risk and sacrifice in the overall deterrent against the Soviet Union.189   
However, the Cold War element of NATO is only a portion of the multilateral 
story. What is often overlooked in the NATO saga is the total disappearance of war 
between European states. In hindsight it seems obvious, but the observation that power 
politics was made irrelevant in free Europe would have been unimaginable in 1939. 
Throughout all of Europe’s centuries of violent competition, from Westphalia to 
Versailles, the incessant fear of nations concerning their own security within a 
competitive system disappeared the day Washington committed to Europe in its joining 
of NATO; the United States, by being the protector of Europe, destroyed that same 
insecurity and fear that had led to the continents violent past.190 
187 Thies, Friendly Rivals, 250. 
188 Ibid,250–260. 
189 Josef Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 64–82. 
190 Ibid, 64–82. 
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By making power politics and its constant calculation and re-calculation of 
nations security and future security something of irrelevance—at least out side the Soviet 
threat—free Europe had little reason to fear invasion or seriously prepare for invasion 
and make its neighbors uncomfortable for that matter. That fear, of another’s power or 
future power, almost immediately became a non-concern to European neighbors and the 
decisions to cooperate in endeavors like the European Steel and Coal Community or 
other nascent predecessors to the European Union became rational decisions because the 
United States removed the Malthusian security dynamic from nations economically 
cooperating and collectively empowering each other because they had to no longer fear 
West Germany invading France any more so than Belgium invading Luxemburg.191 
The biggest achievement of NATO was the coupling of American security to 
Europe. While this on the surface almost makes NATO seem non-multilateral in that 
Europe had little incentive to contribute to its own security against the Soviet threat—
after all, its contribution would have been minimal compared to the deterrence of the 
United States in any situation—it was the act of making inter-European security 
competition anachronistic that removed the Malthusian fear of Europe’s nations and 
opened the door to other more multilateral efforts like the EU. All of this would have 
been impossible in the absence of each individual European nation’s dependence on 
American security and it is unlikely that America would have offered this security if it 
did not fear the potential of a Soviet dominated Europe. In essence, it was not NATO per 
say that was the West’s multilateral triumph, but it was the removal of nation-state 
insecurity—with an entrapped American security umbrella within NATO—that allowed 
multilateral cooperation between nations to be possible. Fear created NATO and NATO 
ended fear between neighbors.192 
  
191 Ibid, 64–75. 
192 Ibid, 80–81. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The effects of Market Empire, the attraction of risk shifting and burden sharing, 
and fear of nuclear war are all profound examples of the roles of fear and attraction in the 
West’s use of multilateralism; however, they are only a sampling and are but the tip of 
the iceberg. The combination of all these things—attraction to a decent standard of life, 
morality, security, international influence, and others doing work toward a common 
interest—combined with the fear of war was the multilateral glue that held Western 
multilateralism together during the Cold War. 
While attraction to peace had always existed, albeit weakly when compared to 
other self-interested attractions and more pressing fears, it was in the aftermath of World 
War II that a new fear contributed to a desire of the U.N., NATO, and multilateralism in 
general. That fear was of Europe’s own nature, a nature that had produced incessant war 
and competition, and it was almost as if Europeans did not trust themselves with the 
freedom to act in their own interest and did not have confidence in their future decisions. 
Furthermore, the way Enlightenment and modernity had created such things as 
nationalism, modern weapons, and other expedients to war, it was also as if Europeans 
were willing to a degree let go of their own national fates after witnessing what they had 
done to themselves. As such, new normative paradigms took shape; paradigms that made 
past objective pressures such as international security competition an evil in itself and 
this to a degree replaced the normative value of jingoistic nationalism.   
Ironically, the West returned to universal values similar to those of the medieval 
Papacy but in a modern and humanist nature. Furthermore, altruism found a political 
force as World War II closed, but nearly by accident. America was founded on the fear of 
tyranny more so from its domestic government than that of invaders and only after World 
War II did it accept a superpower role when the Soviets presented themselves as a threat. 
Essentially, communism allowed fear to push America to benefit Europe and the 
continent was only too willing to accept, not altruistically per say, but out of fear; western 
liberal altruism as a political force was nearly an accidental side effect. When this 
collective guilt and self-admitted moral weakness of Europeans was combined with the 
destruction of World War II the normative aspects of Aquinas’s just war principals 
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became a political force rather than a mere moral argument despite many not even 
knowing who Aquinas was; furthermore, the religious principles of “just war” tradition 
enforced by the United Nations was now a salvation of Europeans from themselves!  In 
retrospect, the values of the medieval Church and the U.N. were very similar; they just 
had a different source of legitimacy and God was replaced by internationalism. More 
importantly, this was a reality according to Europe’s public perception and that 
perception was empowered through elections. Morality finally had political force on state 
leaders.193 
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VI. THEN, NOW, AND THE FUTURE 
While at first glance, and in almost a sweeping heuristic paradigm, it would be 
easy to say that the Europe and America finally got multilateralism right after the end of 
World War II; but this statement would be wrong. It was not multilateralism that saved 
Europe from power politics; Europe was saved by its relative weakness in the face of the 
U.S. and U.S.S.R.   
If not for the self-interest of the United States having a liberal and prosperous 
Western Europe to help combat the Soviet Union materially and ideologically, the 
motivations of politicians would have been much different if not for the Marshall Plan 
and America’s security guarantee in NATO. French fear of a resurgent Germany would 
have remained, German insecurity of a divided nation and the dynamic of Soviet fear 
would have played out differently, and Europe would have likely been a devastated post-
war landmass with social violence and state insecurity facing bigger challenges than ever. 
It was an accidental fate of American national interest and its liberal ideology that gave 
Europe a different path from power politics of the old stripe that had gone wrong. The 
West’s success in multilateralism in the post-World War II and Cold War era was on the 
back of the United States and the coincidental alignment of a prosperous and free Europe 
being in American interest; however, the results of a prosperous West could not have 
been maintained and empowered without such institutions as NATO and the UN. For 
without them, like the Cuban Missile Crises and the efforts Thant demonstrate, a purely 
bi-polar world of American and Soviet dominance could have been much different.194 
Additionally, the benefits that NATO and the U.N. offer have been in American 
interest overall. Whether it is through the UN’s spread of Western values via the use of 
human rights as rhetorical weapons, or merely the ability of Washington to station 
military forces in Europe through NATO to promote its own power, the accident of post-
World War II Western multilateralism has benefited the United States as much as 
Washington has benefited Western multilateralism. It is in the overall environment and 
194 Joffe, “Europe’s American Pacifier,” 64–81. 
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how this world wide multilateral environment has affected the decision-making cycle of 
all leaders that has made Western multilateral institutions most beneficial to Europe and 
the United States. 
Fear and attraction have had overbearing effect on multilateralism all the way 
back to the Catholic Church in the 16th century and these forces have lasted to the 
present day in the way nations deal with each other. It was the fear of both Catholic rivals 
and domestic upheaval after the death of Queen Elizabeth that allowed political figures 
within the Protestant British Isles the ideal circumstance to form a multilateral order 
among the islands’ kingdoms; afterwards, it was the reinforcing prosperity of Empire that 
entrenched the British multilateral experiment into every one of its citizens’ identity and 
essence.   
On the European continent, it was the weakening of the Catholic Church and 
kings’ attraction to disregarding the Churches altruistic restraints to address their fears of 
internal religious strife and foreign invasion. This development led European kings to 
adopt Machiavellian paradigms over that of his Aquinian rival philosophy; thus, these 
things led to the age of power politics. Later, it was the fear of the French Revolution 
repeating itself and the attraction of European leaders not meeting the same fate as 
French royalty and aristocrats that motivated international restraint under the Congress 
System and the Concert of Europe.   
The fear of revolutions was later abated by the Industrial Revolution’s force of 
nationalism and the proliferation of industrialized armies forced leaders to once more 
address their fears of invasion by reverting back to their power politic ways in the lead up 
to World War I. After the Great War, the attraction of politicians to please their 
nationalist and vengeful voters led them to punish Germany and the same fear of those 
vengeful—yet war adverse—voters, motivated politicians to conduct appeasement 
toward Nazi Germany and Imperil Japan and made the political will necessary to keep the 
League of Nation’s relevant a nonexistent force. Therefore, the League of Nations found 
itself no more effective at preserving multilateral peace and security than Neville 
Chamberlain was at stopping Hitler.   
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Finally, it was the fear of the Soviet Union and nuclear holocaust combined with 
the attraction to a peaceful world order protected by American nuclear weapons that 
attracted free Europe into the UN’s and NATO’s embrace; furthermore, it was the change 
of the European voter into a mass and American like consumer instead of an Malthusian 
nationalist or class warrior that gave politicians reason to pursue national prosperity over 
that of national power; thus, these things made the post-World War II and Cold War 
international order one favorable to multilateralism. 
All of these episodes of the international system were caused by the fears and 
attractions of people with the power to dictate the direction of their countries—whether 
they were kings, prime ministers, presidents, or members of congresses or parliaments. 
Therefore, in the epoch that is now dawning or has recently dawned, the fears and 
attractions of these men and woman shall dictate whether multilateralism endures, 
remains relevant, and has the capacity and collective political will either to meet 
international challenges with multilateralism, or even better, shape a current situation to 
ensure challenges unfavorable to multilateral institutions do not get terribly severe in the 
first place. Ultimately, it is the international and domestic environments that these leaders 
exist within that determine their fears and attractions, and therefore, it is the environment 
that determines the success of Western multilateral institutions. 
A. YESTERDAY’S SOLUTIONS AS TOMORROW’S PROBLEMS 
Today, perhaps much like in 1928, the West finds its self at a crossroads, and at 
first glance, the forces of fear and attraction appear to only reinforce the current 
multilateral international system. After all, there are plenty of reasons for nations to play 
the multilateral game of avoiding war, increasing trade, and using an multilateral 
system—rather it be NATO, the United Nations, the European Union or otherwise—
because there is something to be gained by a state from being involved in these 
multilateral institutions for its own self-interest. Furthermore, the disappearing act of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early ‘1990s did not weaken multilateral 
cooperation of Western states but actually increased it. 
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If there was any chance of Western multilateralism being weakened at the end to 
the Cold War it quickly disappeared with Europe’s dependence on NATO—primarily the 
United States—to solve the various Balkan crises of the 1990s that the new EU could not. 
Once again, the multilateral NATO was aggrandized by the unilateral contribution from 
American power. Not only did Europe’s inability to handle problems in its own back yard 
contribute to the post-Cold War relevance of NATO, but it highlighted the need for 
Europe to organize its own common security program so that it would not have to depend 
on it American partner and this began the long process toward the EU’s Common 
Security and Defense Program, a supranational military arrangement of only EU 
nations—a possibility only made possible by the American created secure environment 
Europe benefited from.195  
Additionally, the challenges that Western nations face today are often uniform 
among all; among these challenges are terrorism, failed states, climate-change, and 
additionally, the need for economic prosperity within a highly interconnected world make 
challenges to the West every bit as difficult, and more complicated, than the challenges 
that were faced during the Cold War. Also, all of these challenges are too great to be met 
by one nation alone; therefore, the world’s current economic situation after the onset of 
the 2008 recession has severely limited the means of each of these nations to 
individualistically address these interconnected challenges and the potential of 
multilateral burden sharing for these problems is a strong attraction if not a down right 
necessity to the West—even for the United States.196 
It is the complex nature of the West’s challenges that allow fear and attraction to 
motivate leaders toward multilateral involvement and also to motivate Western states to 
pass as much responsibility to others while seeking to gather maximum benefit of 
multilateral institutions to themselves that keep the West’s multilateral “instinct” more 
present than ever. While perfect consensus is still impossible to meet, the potential of a 
single Western nation benefiting from its involvement in the United Nations, NATO, 
195 Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “Common Foreign and Security Policy,” in Policy-Making 
in the European Union, 4th ed. ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 461–492. 
196 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010). 
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European Union, or otherwise, will keep this instinct in place because of rational self-
interest alone…for the time being. 
Unfortunately, it may be the West’s normative pressures—namely that every 
citizen is morally entitled to certain public goods—whether it be medical services, elderly 
pensions, unemployment insurance, or otherwise—combined with politician’s fear of 
voters that may ultimately crash the current favorable multilateral order. History often 
demonstrates that the solutions of yesterday often create the problems of tomorrow. After 
World War II it was American style consumerism and social welfare that allowed 
Europe’s Malthusian warriors to be replaced by new virtuous brats, an event which made 
former nationalist and class warriors turn into peaceful voters seeking state welfare and 
consumer goods instead of national aggrandizement and class warfare. Now, moving 
further away from the Cold War, the West now finds itself within a deleterious debt crisis 
that will surely lead to difficult times if not resolved. At the end of January 2013 the 
government debt to GDP ratio for the United States was 105 percent and the combined 
debt of all EU nations per its GDP exceeded 85 percent.197 
Debt is not necessarily the biggest risk to the world’s current peaceful and 
multilateral order, but this debt’s second and third order effects combined with 
politicians’ fears of voters may lead to disaster. After all, the French Revolution itself 
was largely caused by the second- and third-order effects of the French state’s debt. 
Further, it is largely normative characteristics and the mere essence of the modern West 
that has caused this debt problem in the first place. The emphasis on democratic 
governance combined with a minimal standard of human dignity for its voters—whether 
it be liberty or an acceptable living standard—has led Western politicians to promise state 
goods to its citizens that government revenue’s cannot provide for. Much like Western 
politicians had to choose between what is prudent or popular in the interwar period, 
modern politicians are now in the same boat and must choose between pleasing their 
197 “U.S. Debt Clock,” U.S. Debt Clock.org. http://www.usdebtclock.org/.; The Associated Press, 
“Euro Debt Burden Stuck at High 90 Percent of GDP,” The Seattle Times, January 22, 2013, 
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2020185821_apeueuropefinancialcrisis.html 
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electorates—that often view welfare a right—or making the hard choices necessary to 
reduce debt.198   
Unfortunately, history does not provide a favorable track record when politicians 
have to choose between what is prudent or popular and electorates could very well be in 
favor of continuing the gravy train they receive from the state over that of making 
personal sacrifices necessary for their governments to reduce debt. After all, it easy for a 
voter to place primacy on his state pension over that of his government’s financial well-
being. Ironically, most voters may normatively agree that debt must be reduced, but just 
as NATO nations agreed that all nations must contribute more to defense against the 
Soviet Union, the path to solving this problem is blocked by all parties’ unwillingness to 
accept sacrifices of their own whether they be a politicians, welfare recipients, or 
taxpayers. Additionally, it usually is easier for a politician to vote for more loans and 
increase debt than it is to tell his electorates that they need to sacrifice as welfare 
recipients or taxpayers.   
Essentially, the current debt crisis is similar to the whole burden-sharing dynamic 
within Cold War NATO but is now permeated all the way down to each individual 
politician and voter in the West. This problem, however, could be similar to that of the 
interwar period, and ironically, democracy and Western values themselves present a 
dreadful challenge upon the current multilateral order because eventually the debt 
chicken will come home to roost if the West is unable to solve its debt crisis. 
The world depression and debt crisis is already taking a toll on the European 
Union. As nations struggle to deal with their debt amidst a recession, not only is public 
opinion of the EU falling broadly, but right-wing nationalist, green leftist, and other 
fringe parties are gaining ground and hold political power that was unthinkable just ten 
years ago. For example, the Jobbik Party of Hungary gained 47 seats in parliament in 
2010; in 2006 this party had zero. Even the Netherlands has seen rises in nationalist 
politics; the Party for Freedom—a party regarded by many as xenophobic—won 15 




                                                 
percent of the popular vote and only fell seven parliament seats short of the country’s 
leading party. Also alarming for multilateralism is an emerging generational gap; younger 
voters—under the age of 36—are only about half as supportive as the EU as an 
instrument of peace as those voters 55 and older. In other words, the habitus of Cold War 
common security is suffering a generational death.199 
Furthermore, Europe’s working class is also becoming less favorable to the EU 
because traditionally affluent nations like France now find their workers competing with 
the “Polish plumber” and other low-wage workers from Eastern Europe able to undercut 
host workers’ wages and employment opportunity. When this circumstance is combined 
with racism and xenophobia’s gaining popularity, it is easy to see how the conditions 
created by the 2008 recession and the ongoing debt crises, via its austerity attempts, are 
giving the average European plenty to be frustrated over.200 
Attempts are being made to remedy debt in Europe, but what is yet to be seen is 
how prudent financial crises management will be rewarded at the polls within Europe 
over time, and therefore, how long domestic political situations within both creditor and 
borrowing nations will allow for current patterns of bailing out at risk countries to 
continue. As Germans experience their own economic hardships, with their own 
economy shrinking half a percent in the last quarter of 2012, one has to imagine that 
political forces in the future will make the German government less likely to grant loans 
to debt crises countries like Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.201   
Much as the United States cut aid and loans before the onset of the Great 
Depression, Europe’s future could be worse than its economic conditions are today if the 
Germans, banks, or other entities capable of offering loans and assistance find themselves 
199 Charles Kupchan, “As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fall?,” The Washington Post, 
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unwilling or unable to “stop-gap” Europe’s debt crises. When one considers that some 
countries like Greece and Spain already have unemployment rates over 50 percent for 
citizens age 25 and younger, the proclamations like that of Greek Prime Minister Antonis 
Samaras, that “Greek democracy is facing perhaps its biggest ever challenge,” and “It’s 
about the cohesion of our society, which is being threatened by rising unemployment, 
like at the end of the Weimar Republic in Germany,” must force one to at least consider 
the potential that the West’s current multilateral success may be in grave danger over 
time.202  Greece in many ways offers haunting resemblances of Weimar Germany in 
more than just economic crises; its domestic neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, became the 
country’s third largest party in 2012. It only had 0.29 percent of the vote in 2009.203 
What happens when debt is bad enough and no outside entity is willing to grant 
loans?  What happens if, like interwar Germany, liberal governance and its ideals—which 
has historically been designed to protect the rule of law and the rights of all—are no 
longer acceptable solutions to the average citizen belonging to a nation’s majority or 
plurality who are in dire straits themselves?  If nations are no longer able to provide a 
minimal standard of living to its citizens through a vibrant economy or state welfare, who 
is going to be an attractive option to voters in all of their frustration?  Who is going to 
have the sway?  Will it be the politicians that preach peace and unity; or will it be the 
politicians whom tap into primitive instincts of mankind and find a scapegoat to focus 
anger toward as an option to meet citizens’ needs through zero-sum and Malthusian 
means?  At what point is another Hitler or Mussolini like figure, though in a modern a 
more acceptable form, able to capture the frustration and anger of a downtrodden people 
unwilling to admit that their own essence and voting patterns are the cause of their 
problems in the first place?  At what point are people willing to be led by an charismatic 
leader that directs their Malthusian anger, created by their own ideals, toward an 
202 Louise Armistead, “Greek Crisis is ‘Like the Weimar Republic,’” The Telegraph, October 5, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9591004/Greek-crisis-is-like-the-Weimar-
Republic.html.; Steve Hawkes, “Youth Unemployment at Record High,” The Sun, February 21, 2013, 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4734360/youth-unemployment-at-record-high.html.;  
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domestic subgroup—like the Jew of the past, or the banker or the foreign low-wage 
worker today—or worst, toward an outside nation as a coping mechanism for their 
suffering?   
Will the violation of a minority “other’s” property, rights, or dignity be an 
acceptable method of alleviating a majority’s or plurality’s own suffering?  If one is 
desperate enough, like Germany in the 1930s, it may be; this time however, the West’s 
own essence of democracy and a right to one’s own entitled financial dignity may be as 
destructive in the future as antagonistic nationalism was in Europe’s early 20th century. 
And all of this, whether it be domestic subjugation of others, or war between nations, will 
be because of the fears and attractions of politicians and their voters.   
Therefore, the modern multilateral world order may in itself, by its very essence 
captured by Western values, create conditions and challenges too great for any 
multilateral order to survive because of the fears and attractions of its politicians may 
very well cause them to pursue popular means over that of prudence, or even worse, the 
rights of “others.”  And not to forget, such environments invite an entirely different type 
of politician to enter the democratic game in the first place—much like the Nazis found a 
home in German politics in interwar Germany. Signally, Western multilateralism may 
find itself in the future as insignificant to the voter and politician as it was in 1914 and 
1939 if desperate Malthusian voters rule the day.   
If all of these musings seem to be fear-mongering and unrealistic, imagine all of 
the nations that make up the West unable to borrow money while their economies suffer 
from soaring inflation and unemployment…and then combine that with the fears and 
attractions of the West’s politicians—and more importantly—their downtrodden and 
newly Malthusian voters that have an expectation of the lifestyle they are currently 
accustomed and want something, anything, to place blame beside their own voting 
behaviors. On top of that, imagine a United States not able to offer a credible security 
guarantee while it deals with its own debt and economic crisis; not to mention how that 
would affect the decision making cycle of European leaders if Russia remains committed 
to expanding its sphere of influence into Eastern Europe. 
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Western multilateralism, and the current peaceful environment the West enjoys 
for that matter, is largely the symptom of Western prosperity and economic growth over 
the last sixty or so years with America leading the way in security and trade; however, 
with the United States in its own financial trouble and finding its own ways to cut 
expenses—including military power—combined with a weakening Europe experiencing 
a debt crisis—not to mention the return of antagonistic nationalism and ideological 
extremism—are all forces that shape politicians’ fears and attractions, and do so 
deleteriously at the expense of multilateral peace…even for the altruistically post-
modern, sophisticated, and self-proclaimed enlightened West.   
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